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Americans use a large amount of energy. We constitute about five 
percent of the vorld's population and use a third of the world's energy 
resources. I We rely on nonrenevable fossil fuels to pover our homes, our 
cars, and many items which used to be run by hand, such as automatic can 
openers, electric knives and forks, thread spoolers, paver car vasher/ 
vaxers, and so on. Everything from the large dairy farm to the space pro­
gram depends on tremendous quantities of natural resources -- for lighting, 
moving, heating, and cooling. More than a third of our energy use is in the 
form of electricity, provided by large power plants vhich in turn require 
coal, oil, natural gas, or uranium. 2 This high-energy-use lifestyle ve live 
is rather luxurious; and it shove fev signs of changing. 
But there are certain obstacles impeding this lifestyle, and the most 
frightening of these is the inevitable scarcity of the resources upon vhich 
ve base our livelihood. The publication of� Limits to Grcvth in 19723 
vas only the first in a long series of scientific confirmations cf the fact 
that the planet we inhabit is finite, and once ve have exploited the re­
sources vhich are available, ve shall no longer be able to live as ve have. 
One of the most significantly affected areas will be the generation of 
electricity: it is possible that our society is so heavily tied to large­
scale power production that no alternatives will be available if resources 
run out. If the alternatives in that situation are the same ones ve have 
today, our consumption of energy will, of necessity, drop precipitously. 
If the United States is concerned to strengthen its defenses against 
attack, release itself from the grip of oil-producing nations, enforce 
emission standards for factories and power plants, reduce air pollution and 
toxic vaste build-up, and simultaneously maintain the standard of living it 
has built up over the past decades, it must promptly begin taking steps to 
remedy the electricity generation situation. Indeed, all of these problems 
- • 
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are tied to our energy system: some of the prime targets for terrorist and 
foreign powers are our large nuclear and coal-fired plants;4 a significant 
proportion of imported petroleum has traditionally been used in oil-fired 
power plants; emissions of sulphur dioxide, nitrous oxides, and other pollu­
tants come primarily from coal-burning power plants; and many toxic and 
radioactive wastes derive from the nuclear power industry. Our attitude 
toward energy use has exacerbated the problem: Americans have long assumed 
that energy consumption correlates directly with quality of life despite the 
fact that such a relation �as proved itself �e,ln the past two decades. 
What can be done to correct this unhealthy situation? Two w-a-tegies 
are greatly needed. First, electricity use must be reduced so that the 
resources we exploit will not be extinguished rapidly. Conservation 
measures have become more popular in the U.S. and electricity consumption 
has levelled off in recent years, but the predictions for the availability 
of resources remain ominous. S The other strategy involves the development 
of new technologies to generate electricity using renewable resources -­
which include sunlight, water, wood, wind, and biomass. Not all of these 
are equally suited to the specific task of converting heat or light to 
electricity. Biomass (soil materials and compost> and wood are most effi­
ciently used to produce heat; wind and water, though excellent sources for 
electricity, are not necessarily available in all areas where they might be 
needed. <As we shall see, the closer a generating unit is to the end-user, 
the more efficient it can be.> Thus sunlight, which is spread relatively 
evenly across the country <though at different durations and intensities>, 
is an ideal renewable resource for electricity generation. Through a pro­
cess known as the •photovoltaic• effect, light striking a specially designed 
cell is converted directly into electricity, requiring no moving parts. This 





In this thesis I will address three large issues related to the devel-
opment of this solar electric technology: First, I wish to demonstrate that ---
photovoltaics offer significant advantages over traditional, nonrenewable 
-���� energy sources -- that they are superior to the technologies now used. Part 
I thus consists of a comparative analysis of coal-fired power plants, nu-
clear fission plants, and photovoltaics. These are widely seen as the most 
likely options in American electricity generation. 6 Each of these energy 
systems will be discussed along the following four dimensions: geology and 
natural limits (i. e. , resource availability and waste management>; tech­
nology <plant efficiencies and the relative merits of centralization>; 
economics (initial capital investment, economies of scale, and long-term 
issues); and politics and policy (the capture theory of government, economic 
determinism, and prudence). 
The second task is to shov that solar energy is important enough to 
develop, despite the lack of short-term economic incentives to invest in 
solar electricity. If this is the case, then the argument for photovoltaics 
takes on new dimensions: instead of merely speaking about photovoltaics as 
•efficient• or •cost-feasible,• ve may also say that it is the proper action 
to take. The consideration of proper actions, and the Justification for one 
proper action over another, is the domain of ethics. Part II assesses some 
of these ethical issues surrounding our energy future. This section focuses 
on our obligations to future generations, with reference to the three con­
ventional schools of ethical thought: consequentialism, deontology, and 
virtue ethics. Part II concludes by broadly defining our needs in terms of 
all of these perspectives, along with a concern for human nature and the 
importance of vision. While this analysis operates on a far more theoreti­
cal and abstract level than Part I, its findings are clearly pertinent to 







The final section of the thesis ponders the problem of change: Hov 
vill our society shift its priorities to bring about the use of photovol­
taics? The tvo strategies which have gained the most attention among envi­
ronmental writers might be labeled •paradigm shifts• and •muddling.• After 
discussing some of the ramifications and underlying assumptions of these 
alternatives, I offer arguments for the adoption of vhat I call •visionary 
mugg_ling,• vhich combines the best of each of these two alternatives. 
The adoption of a new technology is clearly a large and unpredictable 
task. Many changes in human knowledge, in resource scarcities, or in 
societal requirements can dramatically influence both the need for and the 
acceptance of new innovations. In the case of electricity generation, there 
are numerous technologies competing for a place in America's energy future, 
and some of them have gained significantly more attention than have photo­
voltaics. Both the nuclear breeder reactor and nuclear fusion systems have 
been federally funded far beyond levels solar energy has ever attained, and 
the current shadov of solar energy research and development shows the 
effects of that disinterest. But I maintain that photovoltaics offer a far 
\? more flexible an realistic alternative for supplying our power than any of 
the large-scale options offered. While this thesis does not address those 
options specifically, I feel it offers substantial.claims as to the super­
iority of solar electricity. In this thesis I cannot treat the full spect­
rum of issues pertaining to the technical or ethical aspects of photovoltaic 
technologies or of ecological sustainability in general, but I hope it will 





Part I: The Technical Case for Photovoltaics 
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This section attempts to identify the maJor advantages of photovoltaic 
power generation over traditional central station power plants using fossil 
fuels. W I will discuss the three ma3or competitors in terms of decentra-
lized and centralized means for generating electricity: nuclear fission, 
coal firing, and solar photovoltaic cells. While there are a great many 
issues involved in such a comparison - many of which have required entire 
books full of figures and technical data for their Justification - & 
discussion will emphasize issues in four broad areas which seem most crucial 
to the future of America's energy production and use: geology, technology, 
economics, and politics/policy. 
The technologies in question involve highly diverse processes. Simply 
speaking, coal-fired power plants employ the heat energy produced through 
the combustion of coal, which heats water into steam. Nuclear fission also 
converts water into steam, but instead of combusting materials, this process 
relies on the tremendous heat found in the radioactivity of purified uranium 
ore. The steam is then pushed through large turbines, which in turn gene­
rate electricity through their motion. This is known as a •thermal• 
electricity generation process. Once the electricity is produced at a 
centralized, large-scale plant, it is transmitted over electric lines to 
smaller stations which then distribute the power to end-users - residential, 
industrial, institutional, and so on. •Transmission and distribution• <T&D> 
refers to the process of getting power from the plant to the end-user. 
Nuclear and coal-fired plants differ greatly in the procedures required 
both to refine mined materials into usable forms and to create a controlled 
environment for the production of steam. For the purpose of this discus­
sion, coal will be assumed to be a simpler and safer substance to burn 





control mechanisms needed in the use of uranium and plutonium. It is 
important to note, though, that the relative safety cf these resources is a 
matter of much controversy. Radiation and waste disposal problems have 
plagued the nuclear power industry; coal burning by itself fails to account 
for the many lives lost annually in mines, the illnesses suffered by many 
miners (e.g., black lung>, and numerous environmental problems, from direct 
air pollution to the effects of acid rain en flora and fauna. 
As this thesis focuses primarily on solar cell technologies, they re­
quire a more detailed explanation. The photovoltaic effect, that of con­
verting light directly into electricity, has been known for a long time, but 
was not used on a wide scale until the United States began sending rockets 
and satellites into space. The cost of the cells (per peak watt) for space 
missions has always been extremely high, due primarily to the extreme pre­
cision and quality control required for these purposes. There have also 
been problems with the weight of the cells and their encapsulent (cover 
material); the light-gathering arms on satellites cannot bear much weight. 
Solar cells for space use characteristically cost over $1 million per peak 
kilowatt (kWp). (Photovoltaic power is rated in peak kilowatts, since the 
output of the cells is so variable, unlike traditional thermal power genera­
tion systems, which are normally rated in watts, kilowatts, or megawatts. 
Peak power, in simple terms, is the functioning of a generator under optimal 
conditions.> In the last decade or so, the price has dropped to approxi­
mately $10-15,000 per kWp, a decline of two orders of magnitude! But the 
goals commonly accepted for economic feasibility -- i.e., the price at which 
photovoltaics would be able to compete with coal-fired power plants is 
another order of magnitude away. The Department of Energy <DOE> in 1980 set 
a goal of $.70 per Wp ($700 per kWp> by 1986 for array production to encour­
age the industry to achieve cost-feasibility. CA group of cells is encap­
sulated into one unit called a •module•: a set of modules is an •array.• A 
. , 
Page 7 
•field• is a large, centralized group of arrays.) System costs (production 
and installation) would be higher than this figure. <Further, DOE cost 
goals assume centralized energy fields; thus, large T&D systems must be 
included in the cost; these would not exist for distributed photovoltaic 
systems.> But at this level it is thought that photovoltaics could compete 
in most markets, including that for residential power production. 7 
Geology and Natural Limits 
There are two maJor issues to be considered under this heading: the 
availability of resources, and the handling of the wastes (including non-
geological pollution) incurred by the use of those resources. Every energy / 
technology relies on some geological resource, and 
returns some byproduct to the air and the soils. 
every energy technolog'l 
Nuclear power requires 
uranium ore and returns radioactive wastes to the earth; coal firing pro­
duces ash, sulphur dioxide, and carbon dioxide; and photovoltaics require 
vast amounts of � and various other materials in their production. 
Availability of resources 
Coal is a black, highly carbonaceous substance which has the 
capacity to release energy when burned. Types of coal are differentiated by 
their •rank,• depending upon the amount of heat, pressure, and time under 
which they were converted from woody plants some 300 million years ago into 
carbonaceous rock today. Anthracite is the hardest, most concentrated rank 
of coal; thus it is regarded as the most efficient heating material by 
weight. But only one percent of the •identified• coal resources in the 
United States (i. e. , accessible under present mining techniques) consist of 
anthracite; the vast maJority of American coal is the softer, lower-ranked, 
more sulphurous bituminous and sub-bituminous coal. 
Unfortunately, few sources agree about the quantities of coal available 
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on Earth, or, for that matter, in the U.S. The following calculations, 
based on government data, can be assumed to be intermediate between the 
exaggerations of environmentalists and industry studies. (By the capture 
theory, 8 government figures are more likely to reflect the industry perspec- /-
tive than that of environmentalists.> According to a reference published by 
the Department of Energy, the U.S. has coal resources totalling •ore than an 
estimated 3.9 trillion tons. Of that amount, over 56X is undiscovered, and 
much of it is unrecoverable. That leaves 1.7 trillion tons of identified 
U.S. coal, but again, the maJority of that quantity is too deep to be 
efficiently mined, is in very thin layers, or is found under cities and 
other developed areas which are unlikely to be moved for mining purposes. 
The amount of coal in the Demonstrated Reserve Base <ORB> is about 438 
billion tons, about 11.2% of the total American coal resource base. The ORB 
comprises coal that is thought to be •technically and economically minable. • 
Two-thirds of the ORB can be retrieved only by underground mines: the other 
third is accessible for strip-mining operations.9 
But there is, once again, a catch. When coal is mined underground, 
coal •pillars• must be left to prevent roof collapse as well as surface 
subsidence; half or more of the coal must be left in the mines in this 
technique. In both underground and surface mining, much coal is lost to 
geological folds, faults, and interlayed strata. According to Coal Data, 
For the Nation as a whole about half of the reserve base, or 219 
billion tons, is estimated to be recoverable. According to the 
World Energy Conference, the estimated recoverable coal reserves 
in the United States rank first in the vorld, accounting for 
about 31X of the tota1. lO 
The entire world recoverable coal reserve, then, is about 700 billion tons. 
How long can these coal resources last? This is a complex issue, for a 
conclusive answer requires a model for such factors as population growth, 
energy consumption extrapolations, and power generation efficiency esti-
. . 
Page 9 
mates. Very few studies have taken all of these factors into account; it is 
common for these studies to conclude that our coal supply will last well 
over 300 years -- plenty of time in which to consider transition sources of 
energy. 11 The model I have used for my calculations fails to include any 
model for growth; as we shall see, the case is only worsened by such fac­
tors. Coal presently accounts for about 55X of all electricity generated in 
the U. S. Due to the high price of oil and natural gas, coal is widely rec­
ognized as the energy soure of the future.12 Thus it is clear that. the use 
of coal will continue to increase as it has for the last decade, 13 If an 
average coal-fired plant generates at an operating capacity of 500 MW, and 
burns an average of 5. 5 tons of coal per minute, 14 and if, as my analyses 
suggest, there are approximately 910 such plants in the country, 15 then our 
recoverable 219 billion tons of coal will be extinguished within 84 years. 
The only way the United States could produce coal-fired electricity Cat 
present rates under constant population) for 300 years would be to use the 
entire world's recoverable reserve of 706. 5 billion tons. To make matters 
worse, only about half of our coal usage is in the generation of electric­
ity; industrial processes such as steel-making require large quantities of 
coke from coal. We can hardly count on this resource to supply our power 
for much longer. 
This suggests that coal is not the panacea it has been thought to be. 
While there are tremendous coal resources on our planet, we would be im­
prudent to hunt for them, for the cost of bringing them back would likely 
exceed the value of turning it into electricity. In any case, since we have 
less than 100 years of coal accessible to us - despite the short-term 
economic incentives assuming quite the contrary - it would behoove us to 
begin examining alternatives. From a cost-feasibility standpoint, there are 
two competing possibilities: nuclear fission and solar photovoltaics. 
-
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Nuclear Nuclear fission is a more complex means of generating electricity, 
largely due to the protection required to separate the radioactive materials 
from humans and the environment. There are many natural resources required 
to construct and power a nuclear plant; in the interest of time and space, I 
will focus only on the primary resource required: uranium. Nuclear power 
has two large advantages over coal with respect to resource requirements: 
First, while coal plants burn 5. 5 tons per minute, nuclear power plants 
require . 005 pounds of fuel per minute for a like-sized plant. <It would 
take almost 265 years for a nuclear fission plant to use 5.5 tons of uranium 
fuel. )16 Second, fuel costs account for SOX or more of the total cost of 
generating electricity with coal; only 201. of electricity generation costs 
in nuclear plants are devoted to uranium. 17 From a resource point of view, 
nuclear power plants provide a hope which coal plants cannot. 
One of the most fascinating issues with respect to uranium is the 
discrepancy between mined ore quantities and power plant usage. For 
instance, if a 1000 KW nuclear plant needs, say, 36 tons of fuel (U02) per 
year, that does not mean that only 36 tons of uranium ore must be mined. In 
fact, a highly elaborate milling, converting, enriching and fabrication 
procedure is needed to •boil down• the ore into usable fuel -- from ore to 
purified uranium oxide to uranium hexa �ou ·de to the final fuel itself. As 
�� 
a result, 85, 500 tons of ore are needed to make 162 tons of purified uranium 
-- which finally become the 36 tons of fue1. l8 If the average nuclear power 
plant generates at about 1000 KW capacity and if there are 138 operable 
plants in the country, 19 then a total of about 5000 tons of fuel is needed 
in the U. S. per year -- that is, 12 million tons of uranium ore per year, or 
22,500 tons or uranium oxide each year. 
Once again, we must wonder how long this can last. And again, sources 
disagree on the actual resource base available. To take an intermediate 





oxide in the vorld, with a resource base of nearly 4 million tons. By the 
consumption calculations above, ve have 90 years of certain nuclear pover 
and about twice that if a larger recoverable base is assumed. If the U. S. 
has 840, 000 tons in reserve, we can operate at present levels for another 37 
years. 20 <Note that the 90 or 37 year estimate for nuclear power is not 
additive with the figures for coal: these calculations assume a continuation 
of the current resource mix, such that coal provides approximately half of 
our power, while nuclear power generates nearly 15¾.) 
What seemed a trivial discrepancy has become a frightening portent 
about assertions that •nuclear and coal-fired generating plants represent 
the most cost-effective options for baseload service in the foreseeable 
future, • and that •compared to the costs of operating existing plants fueled 
with high-cost oil and gas, the economics of either nuclear or coal-fired 
plants are compelling. •21 We have not yet addressed economic issues in this 
analysis, but already the absolute limits of available resources cause us to 
wonder how economics could possibly help. 
Solar Perhaps the most distinct resource advantage of photovoltaics is 
the cost and availability of fuel: its cost is non-existent in economic 
terms, and its availability is only constrained by inclement weather. 
(Sunlight has indirectly provided humankind with all our energy sources: 
sunlight helped to grow the trees and plants which later were compressed 
into coal, to feed the micro-organisms which were squeezed into various 
petroleum products. But this is the only technology to use it directly for 
the production of electricity. )  The problem of land availability is at this 
point an unresolved issue, but some solar developers have found rooftops an 
ample resource for the siting of photovoltaic systems. 22 The primary re­
source constraints on photovoltaics are material constraints, analogous to 
the concrete and steel required to build coal and nuclear plants. Since 
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photovoltaics require aluminum, copper, nickel, iron, and steel in 
quantities commensurate with fossil fuel generating facilities, I shall not 
devote attention to these resources. 
What photovoltaics do use a lot of is .silicon - far and away the most 
abundant resource on Earth. Silica, known more commonly as sand, is com­
posed almost entirely of silicon dioixide, which must be highly purified to 
be used in solar cells. Silica, in different forms, is thought to compose 
some GOX of the Earth's crust; it will not become scarce during the exis­
tence of human beings.23 Silicon is used as the semiconductor material in 
photovoltaics. It is very difficult to purify, and with the most common 
technology must be formed into very thick (up to 100 micrometers) and 
weighty cells. The purified silicon is cast as a cylindrical ingot, which 
must be cut into round cells. This process is expensive and inefficient, as 
half of the silicon is lost as dust when the ingot is sawed. Hewer tech-
nologies involve poly-crystalline and amorphous silicon cells which can be 
•pulled• as long •ribbons• of 1-30 micrometers in thickness. This method is 
not yet perfected enough to be widely feasible for mass production, and 
photovoltaics remain an expensive technology -- incapable of competing with 
traditional nonrenewable sources of energy. 
Work is now being done with some alternative substances, such as 
Gallium Arsenide (GaAs>, Cadium Sulfide (CdS>, and Copper Sulfide (CuS) . 
GaAs and CdS have the tremendous advantage of both fairly high efficiencies 
and extreme thinness. In fact, GaAs is presently being used as a spray (in 
something called the •substrate• process> on a glass sheet, so the actual 
light-sensitive thickness can be much less than 15 micrometers thick. But, 
as one might guess, these materials have drawbacks as well. Arsenide is the 
same as arsenic and is a toxic substance. Cadmium is one of the better 
known dangerous heavy metals. But cadium is widely used in plating and 
l 
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alloying processes, and is cheaply mined. The world cadium resource base is 
estimated at nearly 1. 39 million tons, easily enough to last many hundreds 
of years. 24 Gallium, not highly toxic, is a byproduct of the aluminum manu­
facturing process. But the amount of aluminum that would have to be pro­
duced for a usable amount of gallium to be removed is approximately 50-200 
times present production. And the aluminum and copper markets are not 
exactly healthy these days. The other maJor problem with any material other 
than silicon is availability. Though much less GaAs or CdS would be needed 
to make the cells, the quantities needed are still tremendous for widespread 
use. With toxicity and limited availability staring one in the face, the 
future may seem dim for some of these experimental substances. But there is 
widespread consensus that silicon solar cells have great potential, and re­
source limits are highly unlikely to impede the its development. 25 
Wastes 
Fossil fuels as a group are notorious for contributing hazardous mate­
rials to the environment. These are generally known as byproducts; we will 
discuss their influence on the planet and the means by which they are 
handled. (Waste heat •thermal pollution• and the climatic consequences of 
excess carbon dioxide from power plants will be discussed in a later 
subsection.> 
Coal contributes to environmental pollution with far greater 
diversity than nuclear fission. When coal is strip-mined, vast quantities 
of land are reduced to barren deserts; reclamation proJects have not been 
particularly successful. When coal is burned, there are four significant 
byproducts: ash, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and carbon dioxide. Of 
these, ash and sulphur dioxide are perhaps the most problematic. A coal­
fired power plant which generates 1000 MW of electricity requires more than 
345 tons of coal per hour. As a result, the plant produces 35-40 tons of 
• 
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ash per hour, or enough ash to fill a 33-car trainload every day - not even 
including airborne particulates! 26 Coal ash can be used in various manu­
facturing procedures, so it cannot be considered a complete waste, but as a 
byproduct of electricity generation it must be considered. 
Coal does not directly contribute much in the way of geological wastes, 
but it is perhaps the largest single culprit in American air pollution in 
general, and in sulphur dixoide emissions in particular. The notorious acid 
rain problem, which increasingly •kills• lakes and forests in the U. S. and 
Canada, is directly attributable to coal-fired electric power generation. 
According to the Council on Environmental Quality, power plants are respon­
sible for more than 76X of sulphur dioxide emissions in the U. S. , or some 24 
million tons per year. 27 Since the passage of the Clean Air Act in 1970, 
electric utilities have spent more than $150 billion on scrubbers and 
electrostatic precipitators to reduce these emissions. 28 (Both of these 
technologies create their own wastes, generally in the form of sludge. ) 
According to one source, plants constructed with scrubbing technology (which 
removes nearly 90X of the sulphur in the flue gas) cost about $400 per kW 
more than those without - more than doubling the price of the plant. (A 
non-scrubbing 600 MW plant cost about $237 million to build in 1980 : a plant 
with scrubbers cost $477 million. ) 29 Clearly, the cost of controlling air 
pollution is exorbitant; accordingly, pollution levels remain well above 
satisfactory environmental and human health standards. 
Nuclear Because of the complex nuclear fuel cycle, fission plants produce 
larger quantities of waste than the amount of fuel they need over a given 
period of time. Thus, while a typical 1000 MW nuclear facility uses 0. 3 
pounds of fuel per hour, it produces 2. 7  pounds of radioactive waste per 
hour, due to the activation of materials peripheral to the process. In a 
year, a single plant produces 12 tons of nuclear wastes. 30 Through 1980, 
• 
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according to a recent government study, •about 36 million tons of low-level 
radioactive waste and 8,300 tons of high-level waste have been generated by 
commercial nuclear power. By the year 2000, these levels could rise to 
levels ten-fold greater •••• •31 But, from a geological point of view, is 
there a satisfactory method for disposing of radioactive vastes1 There are 
three primary ways to deal with them: deep mine repositories, shallow 
repositories, and sea burial.32 
Deep mine repositories: Simply speaking, wastes are put in canisters or 
cylinders and then left in old mines or mine shafts. The cylinders are 
packed so that the wastes are surrounded by an absorbant geologfical 
material. The present controversy in deep mine disposal concerns the type 
of rock to use for optimal absorbence and heat tolerance. The three most 
promising candidates are halite Crock salt), granite, and shale or tuff. 
Halite has the advantage of being ductile and plastic, so that it will 
resist cracking under stress. As it is a soft material, drilling a well or 
mine for the canisters would be inexpensive. But radioa/ctive wastes must 
not only have their heat contained; they must also be kept safely away from 
water sources. Salt, unfortunately, contains water, both in its intra­
crystalline structures and in larger pockets. There may be layers of gypsum 
or clay in halite mines, which are hydrous materials (i.e., if heat is 
applied, they lose water>. Halite is also dangerous because of its 
salinity. Brine, commonly found in rock salt regions, can easily corrode 
glass and metals, thus potentially exposing the wastes directly to the 
environment. There are other probl ems with halite as well, such as fluid 
pressures, carbon dioxide outbursts, solubility, and sags and sinkholes. 
halite is the current favorite for waste disposal, but it is far from ideal 
- or even safe. 
The second possible rock is granite, well known for its hardness, its 
I 
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mechanical strength, and its overall impermeability. But granite, unlike 
halite, is very susceptible to fractures, which greatly undermine its •safe­
seeming• qualities. There is also a seismic risk in storing nuclear wastes 
in granite, as the heat tends to stress the rock, possibly inducing earth­
quakes. As quakes are extremely difficult to predict anyway, it seems un­
wise to tempt fate by burying wastes in a fragile environment. 
Finally, shales and tuffs have been recommended for use in waste 
disposal. Heither is as strong as granite, nor as ductile as halite, 
although each has sorptive capacities sometimes exceeding that of halite. 
But as they are of a clay composition, they will release water molecules 
under heat and lose their sorptive 
ideal of the three alternatives. 
They are considered the least 
Shallow repository: Open-pit mines, craters, and other areas of geological 
subsidence are candidates for shallow repository waste sites. The crater in 
Yucca Flats, Nevada, was considered an ideal spot, being isolated from 
civilization to a great extent, as well as being located in an arid region. 
The crater, with a maximum depth of 100 meters, is almost 500 meters above 
the water table and rests in an alluvium <underlaid by stream deposits) . 
The advantages of such a site are: a) the wastes will tend to get buried as 
the landform continues its natural subsidence, b) the sorptive capacities of 
the geological materials (clays, primarily) will prevent leaching if a 
canister were to break, c) there is little seismic danger in the area, and 
d) the water flux is low enough that the wastes would be unlikely to enter 
a dangerous area of wetness in 30, 000 years. Of course, there are disad­
vantages as well: a> there is some uncertainty about the existence of 
pockets containing water within the alluvium, b) climatic changes would have 
a greater effect on the materials, as they would be quite near the surface, 
c) the area is shallow, and thus becomes increasingly vulnerable to human 
.. 
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excavation - both in peaceful and wartime activities, and d} if the wastes 
hit the water table or even a pocket which selectively precipitated the 
wastes from the still active fuel, the heat of the materials could prove 
dengerous. Even if all of these difficulties were rectified, there are a 
limited number of areas in the nation - or even in the world - which qualify 
on geological criteria for safety and permanence. 
Sea Burial: In the mid-Pacific Ocean, the water is five to six kilometers 
deep, and the bottom is composed of solid red clays. In an area called the 
Horth Pacific gyre (created by the Pacific currents>, there is a paucity of 
marine life, and thus a minimum of geological deposition. In other words, 
the impermeable red clay is more exposed in the gyre than in other parts of 
the Ocean. If canisters were dumped from a boat at the surface, they would 
settle perhaps 30 meters below the sea floor, making the wastes well pro­
tected from the outside environment. This area is probably the most stable 
environment on the planet, having a steady temperature and pressure, tight­
grained sorptive geological materials, a self-closing ability, and almost 
complete lifelessness. 
This sounds like an ideal solution, and it has been tried. Unfortun­
ately, a number of problems have arisen: First, the response of the wastes 
- at sea level pressure in their canisters - in the extreme pressures on the 
sea floor some five kilometers down is quite uncertain. Canisters could 
implode at these differential pressures. There is also the problem of the 
salinity of salt water, which over time, has the potential to corrode most 
materials. Finally, there is the empirically proven difficulty known as 
buoyancy. The heat of the waste causes it to rise slowly through the clays, 
re-emerging at the water's surface years after its •successful• burial. 
( There is no completely satisfactory means for disposing of large quan­
\ tities of radioactive waste. Our technology has to rely on the status of 
• 
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the environment to a considerable extent. The cost of developing new tech­
nologies to protect the environment is thus exceedingly - and increasingly -
high. Once again, nuclear power loses its luster shi 
details are seriously considered. 
when these technical 
Solar Photovoltaics, like most solar technologies, are considered 
•clean•; that is, they do not emit noxious fumes, produce geological wastes, 
or otherwise pollute the environment while generating power, But there are 
two concerns with photovoltaics, and little is known about the effects of 
either on the planet and its atmosphere. First is the issue of reflectance. 
A large land area covered with solar cells would reflect a large amount of 
sunlight back at the clouds, which could potentially encourage the�­
house effect already occurring. The other issue concerns the byproducts of 
p�otovoltaic cell production. Questions have been raised as to the toxicity 
cf silicon dust released in sawing silicon ingots, in addition to the var­
ious other substances employed in cell production - such as cadmium, german­
ium, trichlorostalline, arsenic, and others. Too little is known about 
these processes for any estimate to be made about the likely effects. In my 
Judgement, chances are great that the amounts and concentrations of photo­
voltaic pollutant as a whole will be smaller than that of any single fossil 
fuel installation. Despite these questions, photovoltaics appear to have 
significant geological and environmental advantages over either of the best 
traditional energy sources. � �VIA� � \<. 0• ;...._ 
� C.� '1' I 
Technology 
There are two technological issues which need to be discussed in our 
analysis of energy systems. First is the matter of efficiency: how well do 
these various systems work in theory and practice? The second issue has to 






comparison with the more flexible, easily decentralized solar technology? 
As part of the centralization issue, we must consider the transmission and 
distribution of power, which involves some striking statistics. 
Efficiency 
Coal and Nuclear Power plants of all sorts have a certain capacity of 
electricity which they could generate under ideal conditions -- which 
include humidity, altitude, power demand, proper pollution control, trans­
mission conditions, equipment cleanliness, and the rank and purity of 
the fuel itself. Few optimum conditions are ever met; thus one must 
calculate operating efficiencies for each given facility. Most modern coal 
plants, for instance, produce steam at about 1000 degrees F, and release 
exhaust at approximately 212 degrees F, with a theoretical efficiency of 
54X. In actual operation, coal plants run at efficiencies closer to 40X. 
In other words, when all factors are considered some 60X of the coal needed 
to generate electricity is lost as waste heat. 33 
Nuclear power plants operate at an intake temperature of 600 degrees F, 
and exhaust at the same 212 degrees. They have an upper efficiency limit of 
about 40X, and an actual operating efficiency of closer to 30X. 34 These low 
amounts can be considered a form of waste: the maJority of input fuel never 
affects the final product. 
Solar Solar cells can only convert a small portion of the sunlight which 
strikes then into electricity -- a maximum of 27X with gallium arsenide 
cells, and up to 25X with silicon cells. These are theoretical upper limits 
under present technological understanding. Photovoltaics generally operate 
with conversion efficiencies between 10 and 15 percent. Of course, the 
lover the efficiency, the more cells needed to produce the same amount of 
electricity. At present, a house using 500 kWh each month would need a 
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photovoltaic array of about 220 square feet Cat 15¾ efficiency> to provide 
its power. The roofs on most single-family houses could easily accommodate 
such an array, according to Maycock and Stirewalt. 35 Industrial buildings 
often have tremendous unused expanses of roof-space; although I have not 
seen studies documenting the ratio of electricity needs to the area of 
available roofing, I would venture to guess that most industrial complexes 
would be able to supply a large proportion of their power from photovoltaics 
without using any ground space. 
Centralization 
American electricity generation in the 20th Century has been dominated 
by centralized power-producing facilities. Coal, oil, natural gas, hydro­
electric, and nuclear plants all operate more efficiently on a large scale 
than on a small scale. Fuel is cheaper when purchased in large quantities, 
and the turbines which convert steam into electricity operate far more 
cheaply in large facilities. Photovoltaics represent the first significant 
challenge to centralized power generation, for they operate equally well in 
small and large formats. A million photovoltaic arrays produce the same 
amount of electricity at the same fuel cost whether they are all sited in a 
huge centralized desert field or on a million residential rooftops. If we 
were to produce all of our electricity with photovoltaics, it would require 
2-4¾ of the land area of the United States to do so. 36 But if we used 
rooftops instead of precious land, we would have only minimal land require­
ments for solar power. Thus photovoltaics are highly flexible in their 
t<U ; 
format and capabilities. They can be sized to the end-use requirements as 
no other energy system can. 37 
One of the maJor issues in centralized versus decentralized generating 
facilities has to do with waste heat. A coal-fired plant which can generate 
1000 MW actually produces 2250 KW of energy -- but 1250 NW of that energy is 
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lost as waste heat. A nuclear fission plant loses twice as much heat as it 
produces in electricity -- i. e. , a plant of the same 1000 NW capacity vents 
2000 MW of waste heat to the atmosphere t 38 Central-station plants have no 
useful means for containing and distributing that heat, since much of it is 
considered •1ow grade industrial• heat. ( These plants � cogenerate 
electricity by forcing the excess heat - as steam - through turbines. > In a 
recently devised format, though, homeowners can capture much of the heat 
lost from photovoltaic systems and use it to heat or cool their homes. 
Since space heating has always been an expensive part of American living 
expenses, it is common sense to make use of this radiant energy. 
Another interesting difference betwen centralized and decentralized 
power generation is in the transportation of electricity from the generator 
to the end-user. What are known as transmission costs may be broken down 
into two categories: a) power losses due to line inefficiencies, thermal 
conductivity, and the like, and b )  capital costs intrinsic in the design, 
construction, and operation of the various components of transmission and 
distribution equipment. It should be noted that there is no theoretical 
correlation between large power plants and high voltage transmission. 
Transmission losses are calculated by measuring the amount of 
electricity produced by the generator at its Juncture with transmission 
equipment, and comparing that with the cumulative metered electricity of all 
customers. According to Bob Perry of the Electric Power Research Institute, 
the average loss from generator to customer is about 7X (of the total 
generator output ) - namely 3X in transmission and 4X in distribution. 39 
There seem to be no •per mile• statistics for actual line loss, but two 
maJor factors are essential in making any calculations: voltage and 
distance. Higher voltages create lower losses, while greater distances of 
transmission increase losses. In the plains states, for example, power 
.. 
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losses may exceed 15¾, due to the combined negative effect of these factors. 
solar systems now being pondered are not of the magni-
tude of today ' s  nuclear and coal power plants; thus they would not be 
capable of generating very high voltages. Furthermore, most of these photo­
voltaic fields are destined for desert or otherwise vacant locations (since 
these fields require large expanses of land), which are invariably quite 
distant from the customer. Losses would be considerable in this format. 
But power losses account for only part of transmission costs. One 
aspect of these added burdens is the oft-ignored role of 9onstructicn. 
According to the 1970 National Power Survey, 40 construction costs for power 
lines ranged from $77, 400 to $331, 000 per mile ! The 1975 Statistics of 
Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the United States provides the basic 
data for the calculation of an average upkeep cost of nearly $3000 per mile 
(per year), and about 10. 3X of production plant upkeep costs for the trans­
mission plant. 41 These figures vary, of course, in different regions of the 
country; construction in desert areas, for instance, is more difficult, and 
thus more expensive. Total transmission costs, then, are between 20-25¾ of 
total electricity costs for small customers (i. e. , residential), and 
approximately 30X for large (industrial >  customers. The resulting costs are 
not ones anybody, especially capital-strapped utilities, can afford to pay 
for new generation capacity. 42 
What shall we conclude from these facts? First, we could advocate the 
construction of either larger, or a greater number of, central station power 
plants in order to increase the voltage and decrease the distance of power 
lines. But this solution hardly solves the energy problem the U. S. faces. 
A second alternative might be to rewire longer power lines to carry more 
efficient DC power <as is being done in a few places in the U. S. > or to run 
longer trunk lines with 800 kilovolts or more of AC electricity, thus 
reducing the necessary lengths of some feeder transmission and distribution 
Most centralized 
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lines. This alternative has run into many grass-roots problems due to con­
cerns over radiation, a�ic;:s, right-of-way, a.nd land-ownership consider­
ations. Ultra-high-voltage power line design will, in all probability, have 
to be rethought before the public will accept it. A third and final alter­
native is to look into decentralized power sources, which require little or 
no transmission and distribution equipment. Photovoltaics are a highly 
flexible form of electricity generation ; when such seemingly benign aspects 
of electricity production as transmission costs are brought into the 
picture, the merits of their decentralization also become quite obvious. 
The research and development needed to advance this technology to a level of 
feasibility deserves federal funding and media attention. 
Economics 
) 
In this sub-section I would like to take up three intertwined aspects --l 
/ �/� 
of the conomics of the three technologies in question: initial capital 
investment, economies of scale, and long-term issues. 
Nuclear As we have seen, nuclear power plants can produce large amounts 
of electricity with small amounts of fuel. To do this efficiently and 
safely, these generation plants must be designed and built to very exacting 
standards. The reactor core must be contained in a shell of solid steel 
over a foot thick, and a complex monitoring station must be installed to 
verify the proper functioning of a great variety of machinery, pumps, and 
valves. The typical nuclear generation station requires a construction time 
of seven to 12 years, at a cost of generally more than $1 billion in current 
dollars. During the time in which it is being built, it can offer no return 
on the investment, and the high cost of borrowing capital further delays the 
break-even date when the plant will be able to turn a profit. If the 
building operation were to go smoothly and the start-up procedures flaw-
-
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lessly, the plant would operate in the red C at a loss> for up to 20 years, 
during which time it would slowly repay the cost of its construction. Un­
fortunately, plants already completed have had poor records of operation. 
A number of plants now have had cracked reactor shells, brittle steam pipes, 
and a score of other problems (including leakage of radiation). The average 
plant has an operating efficiency well below 50¼ because of extended down­
time for repairs and testing. 43 As these problems are remedied in existing 
plants, those under construction have to contend with new technologies, new 
regulations (as imposed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission), and new 
costs. According to a number of utility officials across the nation,44 
nuclear power plants completed since 1981 or so will repay their construc­
tion costs only after 30-40 years. 
To an economist thinking in the long run, this may not sound too 
terrible. But there is a catch, a missing piece of data: nuclear power 
plants have an expected lifetime of 35-40 years, and many plants have been 
shut down indefinitely after only 10 or 15 years due to insurmountable 
technical problems. This does not bode well for the nuclear industry. If a 
plant has a theoretical profit-making lifetime of a maximum of ten years, as 
implied above, then its construction is an economic absurdity , the oppor-
tunity costs of the plant are simply overwhelming at that point. The dis-
·-
count rate undermines the value of such a plant to such an extent that the --------
term •profit-making• is quite out of place. The Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac for 1982 estimates that the U. S. government will be spending upwards 
of $24 billion a year for the completion, and upkeep of plants built during 
this decade. 45 The government has subsidized a number of nuclear power 
plant proJects, including the Washington Public Power Supply System <which 
is discussed in considerable detail below ) and the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity plants. Judging by the number of utilities which have had to default 
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on the plants they were b�ilding, 46 that amount is likely to increase even 
if no more plants are completed. A recent government report assumes an 
average economic lifetime of 30 years for American fission and coal-fired 
power plants,47 suggesting that many plants will never turn a profit. 
If a 1200 KW nuclear power plant were to be constructed now, with a 
planned start-up date in 1995, its builders could expect the initial capital 
investment to be about $5. 3 billion. 48 If the plant operated continuously 
for 30 years, and had to pay off its construction costs at 12¾ interest 
rates ( with an average rate of inflation of 5¾), then the total cost of the 
plant would be $5. 3 billion * (1 + . 07)**30 = $40. 3 billion over its 
lifetime. This does not take into account a likely operating efficiency of 
about 30¾. 49 <Note that interest rates now account for as much as 25-30¾ of 
the total cost of new nuclear power plants. ) 50 If the 1200 KW plant pro­
duced 2. 4 billion kWh per year <which is only a little above the national 
average of 2. 126 billion kWh per fission plant per year), 51 and sold the 
power at an average of $. 06 per kWh,52 it would gross almost $128 million 
per year. Over 30 years, it would gross $3. 8  billion. But that leaves 
$36. 5 billion to pay off. Unless these calculations are off b1 an or.cf.er of 
magnitude, there seems little economic hope for nuclear power. 53 
While the economics of coal do not present the frightening statis­
tics of nuclear notoriety, there is a strong parallel to be seen between 
the two technologies. Coal-fired plants usually require 5-10 years to 
build. Since there are no special procedures required for protecting 
against melt-downs or radioactivity leaks, the cost per kilowatt of power 
is significantly less than that for fission. Since economies of scale are 
not as pronounced in the use of coal, the average facility is considerably 
smaller than the typical nuclear plant as well: about 500 KW instead of the 
current 924 KW capacity for nuclear. As discussed above, though, coal-fired 
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generators require large capital investments for pollution control, usually 
at a cost equal to the expenditures for the power plant itself. According 
to the previously cited government report comparing coal and nuclear plant 
costs, a 1200 KW coal-fired plant using high-sulphur bituminous coal would 
cost $3. 2 billion dollars, while a plant using lower-sulphur sub-bituminous 
would cost about $100 million less. 54 Both of these plants would require 
up to a billion dollars in pollution control equipment, despite the differ­
ing sulphur content of their fuels. It should also be noted that, over a 
30-year lifetime, scrubbing equipment would need to be rebuilt entirely at 
least once, thus hiking operation and maintenance costs significantly. 55 
If we use the model employed for nuclear power in the preceding dis­
cussion, we find that a 1200 MW high-sulphur coal plant incurs a total cost 
of $24. 3 billion over 30 years. If the plant generates 1. 26 billion kWh per 
year and sells that power at $. 06 per kWh over 30 years, 56 then its gross 
revenue is about $230 million, only 9X of the total plant costs. Further­
more, high pollution control costs are linked to coal availability: 
About 80 per cent of the coal mined in the United States 
comes from fields east of the Kississippi, but eastern reserves 
make up only 45 per cent of the nation 's  total. Western coal, on 
the average, has a much lower sulfur content - some of it 0. 6 to 
0. 7 per cent - than eastern coal, much of which is in the 2 to 4 
per cent sulfur range. Eastern coal, however, usually has a 
higher BTU content than western coal. But western coal is 
currently in increasing demand because it allows utilities and 
industrial users to more easily meet U. S. government air quality 
standards, which limit sulfur emissions. 57 
One wonders how long power plants on the east coast can afford to transport 
resources from the vest and still provide electricity at feasible costs. 
Solar For the homeowner, an investment in photovoltaics at present costs 
would be a tremendous undertaking. If a family uses about 25, 000 kWh per 
year, 58 then a photovoltaic system of about 10 kWp would be needed. The total 
installed cost of such a system, not including battery storage or power 
inversion equipment (to convert the DC power produced by the cells into more 
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useful AC) , vould be nearly $20, 000. In other vords, the initial capital 
investment of residential solar electric generation has very high oppor­
t�ty costs. The cost of replacing relatively cheap fossil-fuel-fired 
electricity vith solar is entirely infeasible. 
But there are two factors which can be weighed against the opportunity 
costs argument: taxes and payback periods. First, taxes: President Carter --
instituted a tax package during his administration which provided credits 
for installations of solar and conservation measures in homes and busi­
nesses. A number of states passed legislation to add additional credits; in 
"ichigan, for example, the combined federal and state credit allowed the 
homeowner to recover 50¾ of the cost of any alternative energy measure. In 
Arizona and California, the credits could reach 60¾ of the initial capital 
investment. Therefore, a $20,000 photovoltaic system might only require $8-
10,000 after taxes. (The initial capital outlay would still be $20,000; 
most homeowners would require loans to be able to do this. > Unfortunately, 
the Reagan administration has not extended the tax credit legislation, and, 
if nothing is done, the federal credits will expire in 1986. Some state 
incentives will remain beyond that date, but the dual credits will probably 
be needed to spark interest in investing in solar energy. 
The other economic benefit of installing photovoltaics <or any other 
solar system) is what is termed the •payback period. • Since the fuel needed 
for solar power is basically free, one can gradually recover the initial 
cost from the fuel savings over what would have been required for using 
traditional fossil fuels. If a family pays $1000 per year in electricity 
bills, and spends $15,000 for a photovoltaic system, it can consider itself 
to have paid for the system in 15 years. That amount of time is the payback 
period. After that period, the system provides a profit in comparison with 
the electricity bills the family had been, and would otherwise be, paying. 
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In other words, as the price of coal- and nuclear-fired electricity in­
creases, �his sort of opportunity cost increases as wel� and photovoltaics 
become an increasingly profitable investment. 
These figures account only for res�al systems. If a utility 
wanted to install a large-scale solar generating field, the economics would 
be somewhat different. First of all, there is the issue of land. According 
to one source, if a utility wanted to generate the equivalent of 1000 NW 
peak capacity <the largest photovoltaic field to date is l NW, so this level 
is a long way off) , it would need to purchase 13, 000 acres of land -- land 
which could not realistically be used for any other purpose. 59 If land cost 
$200 an acre, this would necessitate an expense of $2. 6 million. At $1000 
an acre, 813 million would be needed for the land alone. The cost of the 
system itself would not be significantly different than that for a homeowner 
on an installed peak kilowatt basis. While wholesale purchasing power for 
various aspects of the system (cells, storage, and power conditioning 
equipment, for instance ) would certainly reduce the initial investment, both 
the lack of federal tax credits and the tremendous losses in transmission 
and distribution of the electricity (as discussed above) would tend to make 
the costs at least as high on a large scale as on a small one. 
There are some economic issues with regard to centralized and decen­
tralized photovoltaic systems which have not been resolved, and they deserve 
mention: First, there is a significant worry over whose expense a photo­
voltaic system would be. Capital strapped utilities would not mind, at 
least theoretically, homeowner purchase of decentralized arrays. But the 
high initial investment required for photovoltaic systems would probably 
cause homeowners to hesitate. Intuitively, since buying a system often 
means controlling its use, utilities would want to buy whatever they could 
afford, regardless of generating scale. In the end, utilities might push 




There is also the issue of resale value. If homeowners install their 
own systems and the systems have problems, the value of the house to a po- � 
tential buyer would be reduced. If solar electricity proves highly reliable 
(which they generally have thus far) , resale values could be expected to 
increase. Several states presently consider solar installations of any sort 
to be home improvements, and thus the value of the house would increase - as 
would its property taxes. As far as the utilities are concerned, if a 
photovoltaic system does not increase the resale value of the house, •then 
the economics for the homeowner in installing the photovoltaic systems are 
questionable. •60 
Tax issues also present economic and legal worries, especially for 
potential small generators. For instance, can legislators consider the 
power produced and consumed by a household to be some form of income? 
Likewise, how would the credits received from power companies for excess 
power sold back be taxed? Could an owner of a solar system claim depre­
ciation as he or she might for other assets? Uncertainty abounds in these 
matters, and it probably discourages many interested people from investing 
in photovoltaic systems. 
A final economic problem is that of economies of scale. There cer­
�-
tainly exists a basic power-producing economy of scale for fossil fuels, but 
this issue is quite unclear for photovoltaics. It is possible, for example, 
that storage for night-time and poor weather is more easily accomplished on 
a large scale, with many thousands of batteries in one place. No one can be 
sure of this yet. Similarly, there may be significant economies of scale in 
maintenance. Providing maintenance for many systems scattered over the 
landscape may be a severe difficulty if homeowners cannot be trained or mo---------­
· vated to do basic repairs. Having all of the arrays together cuts down on 
travel, the necessity to deal with different companies' systems, and perhaps 
.. 
• 
the number of workers needed to do the work. 
with having to provide their 
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Homeowners may be unsatisfied 
on rooftop systems and may 
hesitate to invest in the technology until issues of this sort are clari­
fied. The data are not in, and the experience is too limited. There may be 
other, as yet unknown, economies, or diseconomies, of scale, which may only 
arise following years of actual experience. Overall, it is difficult to7 
claim that photovoltaics are at resent cost-effective. _j 
Politics and Policy 
Energy policy in the United States has long been a controversial issue, 
and few administrations have dealt with energy production and consumption 
forthrightly and prudently. In this subsection I shall once again alter the 
format of the discussion, for in the political sphere the three technologies 
under consideration cannot be kept distinct. Nuclear policy is only an ex­
treme case of the centralized infrastructure which governs coal and other 
traditional non-renewable fuel sources. Solar energy has been promoted 
sparingly, indeed by only one administration in American history, suggestive 
of the same mindset so pervasive in the area of energy regulation as a 
whole. In the following discussion, I shall refer primarily to nuclear 
power, arguing that its prominence in American public policy is yet another 
strong argument for a prudent rethinking of our energy priorities. I shall 
discuss these _!!:>ur co�rns: a) the capture theory of government, b) eco-
L � 
nomic determinism, c) regulatory procedures, and d) the prudence argument of 
our prisoner's dilemma. The typical policy decision-making process <see 
figure) represents a cycle which is intended to maintain a stable democratic 
government. As we shall see, in some cases this process is conveniently 
ignored or circumvented; in others it fails to account for all of the issues 
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In an article comparing the governmental structures of the U. S. and 
v.>A- ? 
France in terms of nuclear power, Jack Barkenbus suggests that tqis process 
-z:::,, 
has too many •access points• for public disapproval of nuclear power for any 
policy to get anywhere. 61 In the 1960's and early 1970 ' s, the public 
generally supported atomic energy and there were very high growth rates in 
electricity demand. The Atomic Energy Commission was the central policy 
maker, and had a three-part role : promotion, research and development, and 
7 
regulation. The AEC was minimally affitcted by Congress, and the Courts had __, 
little interest in the issue at that time. Thus the AEC had a free rein 
in handling the future of America ' s  energy generation. In its two-faced 
role of promotion and regulation, no good offer was refused, and the regula­
tory function of the agency was all but lost. 6_:ring this period, the 
policy process faileJ Most of the checks and balances intrinsic to the 
system were undermined, and only a few interest groups were favored. This 
was an excellent example of the •capture theory• of governmental agencies, / 
whereby the government's interests become those of the industry, and the / 
personnel in the high ranks of each become almost interchangeable. { 
The political environment in the latter 1970's was quite different. 
Congress finally realized that promotion and regulation have to be 
separated, and the Nuclear Regulatory Agency was formed for the latter 
function, while transferring the R&D duties to the Department of Energy 
�-
___ ...,v ____ _ 
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and to the industry itself. Through this move, more governmental bodies 
were included in the policy-making process, and more interest groups were 
given access as well. The courts began taking an interest in energy policy; 
Congress passed regulations concerning the freedom of electric utilities in 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act C PURPA> and others; many Congres­
sional committees and subcommittees were formed; state governments initiated 
their own legislation and challenged that of the federal government; and 
environmental groups started serious campaigns against nonrenewable energy 
sources in general, and nuclear power in particular. 
All of this, on top of the economic recession in the coal and nuclear 
industries, served to slow the momentum of the •electrification program• 
which had once promised almost free electricity. Barkenbus describes the 
French governmental structure as quite rigid, by comparison, in its linear 
and uncompromising pattern. The French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) has 
the power of our old AEC; the CEA can dictate policy recommendations to the 
Parliament itself. As the nuclear industry is government-owned in France, 
the competitive interests of utjJ..i±.y companies are nonexistent, and very 
little access is provided to the �c itself. This •1ron triangle• of --
policy making is incompatible with the U. S. system, for we rely on the 
balancing views of the public in the vast maJority of our policy decisions. 
As Marc Roberts, a political scientist at the Argonne Labs, has said, 
•our institutions were designed to resolve confli'7:;""\ promote the repre­
sentation of diverse interest, and respect the vi� of committed minor-
ities. They were not intended to produce economically efficient schemes of 
resource allocation. • Alan Stone, similarly, reflects that •if there is a 
will to delay, there is usually a way to do it. •62 In sum, the policy 
process in this country works to prevent large scale development in any 
direction, be it renewable or fossil fuel. It forces us into an incremental 
mode of decision making, regardless of whether that mode is needed, bene-
7 
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ficial, or useful. 63 
Another part of this decision-making process has to do with what might 
be called the •policy• of economic determinis,JJL. Many environmental writers 
-
advocate the reliance on the market system for the development of approp-
riate energy technologies. It is their view that the cost of non-renewable 
resources will increase to the point that there will be no choice but to 
explore alternative energy sources, simply due to the law of supply and 
demand. Amory Lovins, for instance, maintains that when the government 
supports R&D in alternative energy, it is more likely to hurt the effort 
than to help it, in part because of its emphasis on large-scale, centralized 
energy generation, and also because of its inability to deal with proJects 
on a small economic scale - independent of the scale of generation. 64 
Of course, it is especially harmful to the alternative energy movement 
when th
�
ernment subsidizes another energy source, and worst of all 
nuclear. The Clinch River Breeder Reactor Demonstration ProJect in 
Tennessee was a prime example of extravagant government R&D spending on a 
fruitless proJect. Billions of dollars were pumped into the Clinch River 
proJect, and nothing ever came of the proJect; Congress finally killed the 
proJect in mid-1983 . President Reagan ' s  advocacy of this proJect, thought, 
was a contradiction of his •policy• of leaving energy decisions up to the 
marketplace. Such a policy might have worked if applied consistently; in 
his attempt to disregard the policy-making process and proceed through 
alternate routes he failed to address the serious problems at hand. 
Reagan 's  •philosophy• also has an element of disregard for the impor­
tance of regulatory procedures governing the energy industry, which is only 
an extreme version of the views taken by past administrations. Let us take 
another international comparison as an example : The CANDU light-water 
reactor system used for electricity generation across Canada has never been 
t' 
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subJect to the same kind of uproar our nuclear reactor designs have. Why is 
this so? What is it about the Canadian political system that has saved the/
� 
from detractors?  One likely reason is Canada ' s  emphasis on •regulation by 
results, • which requires plants to demonstrate their capability to handle 
safety problems before getting officially licensed. Canadian nuclear gener-
ating facilities are prohibited from operating prior to these rigorous tests 
of design and operating personnel. American plants must only comply with 
sometimes untested legislated details, not demonstrated operating standards. 
The Canadian policy could certainly be applied to all new and experimental 
energy systems as well as those accepted by traditional standards. 
Finally, there is an important link between nuclear power policy and 
the resource constraints of the natural world. �e sort of analysis must 
be done to estimate, perhaps qualitatively, whether the policy decisions of 
our country are moving us in the right directi� No one can deny that 
nuclear power has been intended to supply America ' s  long-term energy future: 
our policy Judgments clearly have a long term environmental future. Thus, 
we might wonder whether solutions have been found to the maJor problems with 
nuclear power - on the technological, economic, and policy levels. Against 
that question, we need to investigate the potential policy outcomes 
depending on whether our policies take us in the direction of nuclear or 
solar. What does the result look like? The table below looks a bit like 
the philosopher ' s  favorite: Pascal ' s  wager concerning the belief in, and 
the existence of, God. In Pascal ' s  wager, one only seriously •loses• the 
wager if one believes in God and He turns out not to exist. Here, humankind 
"loses• most seriously if we invest in nuclear energy without a long term 
solution to the problems of the energy source : 
J 
�1--.�-n-.� 









Invest in Nuclear Power? 
No: 
Yes solar 
I I instead I 
-------- 1 -------------- 1 -------------- 1 
Yes I All set I No loss I 
____ 1 _______ 1 _______ 1 
I I I 
No I Disaster I Close Call ! I 
-------- 1 -------------- 1 -------------- 1  
Interface Between Policy and Resource Constraints 
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This variant on the prisoner's dilemma is, in essence, an argument for 
prudence -- for the wise choice of energy systems to carry us into a sus­
tainable future. As we have seen in the diverse arguments above, sometimes 
directly and sometimes by default, solar electric technologies provide the 
hope for a future which nonrenewable fuels cannot begin to promote. What is 
-
needed is to begin pushing for technological, economic, and political ad­
---::;::::;:z-
vances in photovoltaics, so that we can be well on our way to sustainability 
before nuclear and coal-fired systems run out of fuel. But how do we 
inspire such change, and what steps can we take to see it through? Part II  
ome of the ethical systems and visionary possibilities which might 
b n bringing about energy sustainability. 
Page 36 
Part I I: Ethical Foundations for a Solar Future 
As we have seen, the advantages of photovoltaics, and of solar energy 
in general, far outweigh those of coal-fired or nuclear power plants; photo­
voltaics can thus be said to be a superior form of electricity generation. 
Nevertheless, our society is powered by the latter two types of energy. 
Electric utility companies have a long-standing control on the power gr�d, 
and they have shown little interest in change. As homeowners we pay the 
utilities for the electricity which we use, and when they want to charge us 
a higher rate for that use we tend not to be included in the decision-making 
process; instead, the utility appeals to an administrative and regulatory 
agency composed of appointed officials who supposedly represent the public 
interest. The current system is heavily dependent on centralized ewer. 
Why is this the case? If photovoltaics are so clearly superior, why do 
they not cover rooftops across America? Why are they not widely accepted 
(or even known> by the American public? We have accepted telephones, 
computers, and air transportation with relative ease; why can we not do the 
same with a new efficient form of energy generation? Perhaps we accept 
innovations only if an immediate economic incentive can be garnered by 
adopting them. But it seems that if a new technology shows clear signs of 
importance, the short-term gains should exercise less influence. There is 
no question that solar cells are important; that is not the problem. But do 
they offer a clear immediate econgmic gain1 
The answer is clearly � For photovoltaics to become economically 
viable, as we have seen, the cost of producing silicon cells must drop by an 
order-of-magnitude so that they can reasonably compete with traditional 
nonrenewable sources of energy. Additionally, they must be mass-produced, 
packaged in usable ways, and a non-toxic, long-lasting form of storage must 
be developed to store the electricity the cells produce. But there are 
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other important factors to be considered in the adoption of photovoltaics. 
While this technology does not presently offer large economic gains, or even 
promise widespread feasibility for the immediate future, we have seen that 
it merits serious consideration. A strong argument can be made that the 
/ adoption of solar cells is a proper course of action for a national energy 
\ strategy, that this technology ought to be used. Thus there is a discrep­
ancy between what people are likely to do and what it appears they should 
do; a careful analysis is then in order to sort The ---
analysis of the basis for proper actions is the domain of ethics. Thus, 
because of both the importance and the short-term economic unlikelihood of 
photovoltaics, the question of their adoption is ethical in nature. Part II 
of this thesis is devoted to a discussion of some of the moral dimensions of 
the debate over the production and use of energy. 
Many ethical themes have been raised in the environmental and alterna­
tive energy contexts, but one of the most interesting and insightful con­
cerns our obligations to future generations. If one is serious about 
achieving some level of sustainability, one is necessarily concerned with 
the people who will inhabit such a society. This topic is the focus of Part. 
II. To begin with, we shall see how the classical schoola of ethical 
thought deal with this ieaue, for these schools provide universal Justifi­
cations for ethical standards of all sorts. We shall then be able to see 
ways in which a synthesis of all of these views might provide a useful 
framework for discussions of future generations. Finally, we shall look at 
two of the failings of traditional ethical thinking, with respect to the 
importance of human nature in ethical assessments and the centrality of 
vision. 
The issue of our obligation to future generations is not a simple one. 
Some philosophers argue that we do not have any such obligations, for our 
.. 
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fair treatment will never be repaid. We do not even knov the people ve 
{JV ,� � w,J· . ._� 
vould be helping toward a better life; thus there is no moral or economic 
incentive to provide anything for them, be it resources, information, or 
technology. We have an even smaller incentive to sacrifice anything for the 
benefit of future generations. This kind of argument could be called the 
•what has posterity ever done for me?• perspective. 65 
But there is considerable agreement in the bulk of the literature on 
ethics that present generations owe something to the future, that posterity· 
has at least !2:!!!!, claims on our behavior. A fev writers suggest that all ve 
owe to the future - and even to our own children - is the freedom to explore 
the environment as ve have been able to, as well as the opportunity to live 
a good life. 66 Other writers see the problem as considerably more involved, 
vith many variables and many possible outcomes. This is vhere the classical 
schools of ethical thought become pertinent, for the ultimate Justification 
of our actions is called into question. · The three large schools focus moral 
Justification on three different factors: the consequences of an action 
(consequentialism & utilitarianism), the nature and characteristics of the 
action itself (deontolo >, and the person undertaking the action (agent or 
school of thought and the difficulties each may face. 
Utilitarianism 
Probably the most popular version of consequentialism is utilitarian-
ism, due largely to John Stuart Mill's book by that name. 67 To over-
simplify matters somewhat, t'l't . . � . d in the motto •the u 1 1 ar1an1sm can summarize 
greatest good for the greatest number•: we must maintain and increase the 
happiness of as many people as possible. While there is another facet to 
this catch-all motto, let us look at it in this form for the moment. 
If the greatest good is the happiness of the greatest number, then ve 
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certainly have to parcel out the means to happiness in an extraordinarily 
stringent manner. Why? Because the greatest number includes those of us 
alive nov - nearly five billion people - and all those vho vill be alive in 
the year 2020, for instance - perhaps eight billion - and all of the 
possible people whose very existence is contingent on the actions we take 
today and on the actions taken by a future generation in the year 2020. 
energy is�primary means to happiness and pleasure that it has long been 
assumed to be, then whatever resources ve have nov must be conserved for 
their future use. The greatest number of people vho would use those 
resources are not yet born; our 4. 8 billion .people hardly compare in number 
to the eight billion expected in a few decades. Therefore, utilitarianism 
would seem to suggest that severe rationing of fossil fuels should commence 
immediately and that the development of renewable resources should receive 
top priority. It is not a matter of incentives but of moral necessity. 
�-' Utilitarianism seems to imply, further, that the greatest number sho
�
ld (1) 
exist to take pleasure in whatever happiness is available -- that bigger is 
l) 
better. The motto as it stands suggests an assumption that equal moral �� 
weight is given to all people68 and a conclusion that the greatest good 
will have to be carefully rationed in the present under the expectation that 
future and possible people will desire it Just as we do. chis reveals a 
significant disparity between the way present and future people are ,/ 
assessed in utilitarianism) It seems quite able to account for present 
actions among present people, but the calculus required to assess the 
desires of the future give this school pause in its ethical evaluations. 
Nov let us add that third facet to the motto: ·The greatest good for 
the greatest number over the greatest period of time.• Does the time factor 
change anything? The •greatest period of time,• taken to its logical (and 
physical) extreme, is eternity. And it is that very eternity of which we 
.ti 
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speak when we argue about future generations: as Annette Baier suggests, 
they are unknowable, indeterminate, and contingent. 69 Because of these 
uncertainties, because we can know so little about our great-grandchildren, 
we would expect this school of thought to be cautious in its apparent 
generosity to t�e future. But the motto of utilitarian ethics seems to 
suggest that no limits need be placed on the number of humans or the extent 
of time during which this greatest good is available. In other words, its 
terms reflect an interest in maximums and not optimums. In a finite world, 
V,­
we are causing our O'!(!l extinction whenever we base our ethical, politic_
a� "..,;-
� 
V --t' (' f-o:_I" rf'; uh and economic actions (such as cost-benefit analysis> on such maximums. v � j..,,..,..,,. � 
��1� �  Additionally, there is the problem of convincing present people to ac
�
; 
on the behalf of the future. As Norman Care contends in an article on this � 
subJect, it is very difficult for present humans to be motivated to be 
concerned about people who are in no way knowable, whom even their great­
grandchildren will not know. Future people Cas opposed to •possible• 
people; see above> are at best potentially knowable, as their lives could 
overlap with present generations or with •knowable• generations. 70 Care 
states that •people as we know them are not, and cannot be expected to be, 
motivated by 'a concern for generations to come' to act upon what morality 
requires for the world of the future. •71 
Peter Wenz responds that •no form of utilitarianism which excludes 
pos;!,!-ble people in its calculations can supply an adequate standard of 
evaluation for alternative energy policies. In sum, the choices between 





about, present, certain future, or possible future, people,�o have an :�
� 
ethical obligation to leave the world in a clean enough and safe stat.;) 
Would that future generations may inhabit that world without suffering 
unnecessary health risks or fearing the perils of a nuclear explosion due to 
the mismanagement of one of 2.!!!:. decommissioned generating facilities or 
·"' 
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waste disposal sites. <It is interesting to note that cost-benefit analy­
ysis, the procedure which would typically be used to determine which policy 
is •best• for the likes of nuclear power plant safety, is characterized as a 
utilitarian, or consequentialist, decision-making process. These analyses 
weigh the costs and benefits of the likely results of the action to be 
taken.) There is no doubt, finally, that the consequences of our actions 
must be weighed in an ethical evaluation, but utilitarianism is hard pressed 
to account for that which it cannot know. v· 
Deontology 
Where does deontology stand on the issue of future generations? Dis­
cussion on this topic is somewhat speculative. Immanuel Kant, the o�al 
spokesman for this school of thought, once said, •the future is not one of 
my concerns. •73 This school of thought is not primarily concerned with the 
effects or consequences of an act, but with the action itself. As Bernard 
Williams suggests, •surely !Q!!. actions, compatibly with consequentialism, 
might have intrinsic value?•74 The basic deontological principle for deter­
mining right action can be stated as follows: •An action is morally right 
if and only if it is the action required by a duty that is at least as 
strong as any other duty in the cirumstances. •75 Kant contended that the 
nature of moral standards must be universal and consistent. If one makes a 
promise, one is morally committed to keep it. � 




ethics: we have an intrinsic obligation to treat each other morally. This�� P ,.., 
f v-"-_,;;, � 
,,,. 1-j raises the question: what is our duty - and to whom is our duty to be 
directed - in terms of the use of scarce resources? Consider the model of 
ecolo In addition to evolutionary change, genetic diversity, and preda-
tor-prey relationships, one of ecology 's most significant tenets has to do 
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with •limits to growth.• When a population of organisms finds a large 
supply of food or forage, it can devote more of its own biological energy to 
reproduction. As the population grows, the supply of energy resources must 
shrink. At a certain point, the resource base cannot maintain the popula­
tion, and one of three things will happen: the population can split into 
smaller sub-populations and explore new resources, it can level off at what 
is called the carrying capacity, or it can exceed that point through 
mismanagement of resources and soon •crash• as organisms die of starvation. 
�� Many species are subJect to these rules, and humankind is among them.  
The obvious initial question is this: what does an ecological model 
have to do with deontological ethics? 
��I.A,�. obligatory responsibilities in order to maintain the population growth rate � 
Ecology provides a context for 
\� lJ.-11,1-
at a level which can survive on the available resource base, or to monitor � � 
 
and protect the resource base so that the population may use it over a long er� � 
�-a:-- __, 
period of time. As Gary Coates suggests in his Resettling America, •the a»--�)· 
/;} �.r� lY k- -� . ',L_' ' limits to growth' debate is no longer about vhether it is possible (or 
desirable) for infinite material growth to continue in a finite world. 
Rather, it is about when, and how a transition can be made to a sustain­
able ••• society. • As noted in The Ecologist, •the principal defect of the 
industrial way of life with its ethos of expansion is that it is not sus­
tainable. •76 In other words, ecology demonstrates in biological terms what 
deontology might suggest for our crucial obligations to the future. 
So what obligations does •deontological ecology• dictate? First on the 
F 7 
list might be resource conservation. We have an intrinsic duty, one could ��. 
< :0,. 
��:-
argue, to maintain our natural resource base for present and future genera- � �
(; 
, ,rv" 
tions alike. Another important duty we have (in resource use) is to develop� ,-e-,,-1),, J;v;.� f.C, 
and implement technologies which provide energy through unlimited resources: w-A �; 
sun, water, and wind. This helps to maintain the base of nonrenevables we �
.fv 
have as well as to foster the longevity and sustainability of the planet and 
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its inhabitants. Future future human innovation certainly provides the 
possibility for a •way out• of our seemingly inevitable scarcities; it 
would not be wise, though, to bank on a potential we cannot anticipate. 
But three interconnected questions this point. First, are we 
morally Justified in taking any single action? Deontology seems to suggest 
that we have multiple duties to other people, that we have an obligation to 
take as many steps as we are able in the name of sustainability. While it 
is proper to conserve energy by adding a second glazing to windows, one can 
also install insulation, invest in solar equipment, and reduce energy con-
sumption. Deontology would ask that we do all of these things. But the 
multiple duties concept has another dimension as well: Not only do we have 
obligations to carry out multiple tasks in the present, but we have to 
consider the multiplicity of time as well. In other words, we have duties 
tovard our fellow humans now Just as we do to those who do not yet exist and/ 
whom we will never know. Deontology thus provides a counter to the appar- J 
ently unbalanced bias toward the future in utilitarianism. 
Second, it is not clear to whom these obligations are directed. 
0hereas utilitarianism provides a clear directive to ensure the happiness of �f 
all people, present and future, d�ology offers no significant requirelf' � · � 
' 
�� � 
ments for the future
/\
;rn fact, this school of thought could be said to  
restrain present sacrifices to future generations, for the sake of those 
currently living. The multiple duties ve have in energy conservation, for 
instance, may be intended as much for the preservation of the biosphere as 
for the sustainability for humankind. 
This brings up the third question of Justification: How can we speak 
of an intrinsic obligation to non-existent people? One what basis would 
such an obligation be made? It seems to me that the consequences of our 
present actions have a clear bearing on the well-being of future flora and 
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fauna, humans included. And a concern for consequence does not qualify as a 
deontological standard. Thus I would argue that there is no intrinsic value 
in conserving present resources for future sustainability. An argument on 
consequential grounds is necessary to support such an ethic. In terms of 
future generations, neither utilitarianism nor deontology alone offer a 
clear and concrete perspective on how, and for whom, we must act ethically. 
Agent Ethics 
The final school of thought I vant to address is that known as •agent• -
or •virtue• ethics for it is concerned vith a Justification based on the 
character (or virtue) of the person (or agent) carrying out an ethical 
action. This school has its roots in the writings of Aristotle, but its 
revival has been quite recent in comparison with the former two schools. 
� 
� 
The agent perspective sets forth a different kind of question: ·What kind of 
humans should we be?• 
Robert Louden suggests that, instead of having principles and rules 
about what moral actions an agent ought to do, •the concept of moral 
ought ••• seems now to be explicated in terms of what the good person would 
do. •77 In other words, moral actions must be based on such virtues as 
truth, Justice, generosity, kindness, and the like; immoral actions have 
their foundations in such vices as greed, envy, intolerance, and dishonesty. 
Phillipa Foot, a noted contemporary philosopher, feels that a moral agent 
performs on the basis of a direct desire, •without first believing that he 
or she morally ought to perform that action or have that desire. •78 It 
seems that humans are more likely to have an intuitive sense about whether 
they are being honest or kind than about whether they have a particular duty 
to do something or not. One can be more certain, in most cases, about the 
former than the latter. 





many ways: First, a virtue ethic downplays the decision-making process in a 
given act; there are certain •long-term characteristic patterns of an 
action• which seem to be more useful in ascertaining its morality. Teleo­
logical and deontological ethicists would appeal more readily to a practical 
•determinate decision procedure• to solve a moral problem. Second is the 
iss�e of motive. Where the deontological motive is moral duty or obli­
gation, and where utilitarianism bases its actions on the maximization of 
pleasure, agent ethics relies almost exclusively on the virtues themselves 
in motivating moral actions. As Louden notes, •the agent who correctly acts 
from the disposition of charity does so ••• not because it maximizes utility 
or because it is one' s duty to do so, but rather out of a commitment to the 
value of charity for its own sake. •79 
H. Richard Niebuhr, in his classic work, The Responsible Self, dis­
cusses these virtues in terms of •fitting• actions. For Niebuhr ethics con­
sists of a ser-ies of human responses to moral problems; •and for the ethics 
of responsibility the fitting_action, the one that fits into a total inter­
action as response and as anticipation of further response, is alone condu­
cive to the good and alone is right. •80 In the •ethics of the fitting,• 
we find ourselves led to the notion of universal responsibility, 
that is, of a life of responses to actions which is always qual­
fied by our interpretation of these actions as taking place in a 
universe, and by the further understanding that there will be a 
response to our actions by representatives of [the] universal 
community, or by the generalized other who is universal, or by an 
impartial spectator who regards our actions from a universal 
point of view, whose impartiality is that of loyalty to the 
universal cause. Bl 
Finally, •the questions we raise about [responsive actions] are not only 
those of their rightness or wrongness, their goodness or badness, but of 
their fitness or unfittingness in the total movement . ••• •82 
These statements clearly give rise to the question of future genera­
tions: Where does the future stand for virtue ethics? From Niebuhr' s 
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comments, it is apparent that virtue ethics does have a stake in the future 
of humanity, that •the kind of humans we want to be• is somehow related to 
the way we bring up our children and imbue them with ethical foresight of 
their own. When Wendell Berry discusses the need for a •nurturing• culture 
based on sustainable, organic agriculture, he clearly cares about the proper 
patterns of character which will best maintain a •healthy community. •83 
Along the same lines, the universal virtues in Christian ethics, including 
love, honesty, kindness, and fairness, may be expressed in many different 
ways, but they certainly share qualities of timelessness and universality 
both inherent qualities of the future. We can theorize, by extrapolation, 
that a member of any culture on Earth is able to feel at least some 
derivative of each one of these virtues; our children, we may also observe, 
somehow •know• what it means to be honest, what it means to be fair. If 
these virtues are cross-cultural and inter-generational among living people, 
it is reasonable to expect that they would be equally understood a thousand 
years in the past and a thousand years in the future. Based on what 
literature we have from the past, this seems to hold in one direction; we 
can only wait and see whether the future will reflect these patterns. 
If everything were so straightforward, there would be a lack of moral 
dilemmas among human beings. But a few factors loom large in the path of 
complete and timeless harmony. The first is the other side of the virtues: 
the vices. We can look all the way back to Oedipus Rex and see clearly that 
some of our more prevalent vices (i. e. , greed and envy> have been around for 
a long time, and show no sign of waning. The second issue has to do with 
the environment surrounding the agent and his or her action. As Richard 
Bondi notes in ·The Elements of Character,• one's character is greatly 
influenced by that environment: 
Our subJection to the accidents of history means that 
character •. • always has a context - perhaps several contexts 
which offer rival interpretations of what events, circumstances, 
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and the past itself might mean, and which calls us in different 
directions into the future. One of the chief tasks of an ethics 
of character, then, is delineating these multiple contexts and 
their implications. 84 
Ethical actions are most easily understood within their particular context, 
within that set of events and circumstances which lead to what Niebuhr calls 
a •responsive action. • But this notion of context becomes considerably more 
difficult to assess when the moral agent must be placed in a certain pers­
pective along with the actions that agent takes. It is probably not useful 
to claim that a prostitute cannot take ethical a�tions in energy conserva­
tion or be concerned about future generations simply by reason of being a 
whore. On a less crude level, it would not aid the movement toward ecolo­
gical sustainability if only environmentalists are morally allowed to take 
the proper actions in that direction. Virtue ethics is at times in danger 
of falling into this trap; prudence, if nothing else, dictates the 
impracticality of that strategy. 
A third and final problem with the �erspective of agent ethics on 
future generations has to do with social versus internal ethics.' Virtue 
ethics seems preoccupied with individual, internal morality; questions about 
which action best displays human virtue are more central than those of 
interpersonal, relational attributes. Few proponents of a virtue ethic 
asked the question: •How might humans best treat each other?• If we are 
concerned primarily with our own image we are failing to notice the special 
obligations we have and the virtues we must use. I do not intend to engage 
in an extended discussion on the matter; I only wish to suggest that •rela-
_tional• ethics deserves at least as much concern as •internal• ethics in the 
virtue school of thought. As the great Rabbi Hillel once said, •If I am not 
for myself, who will be for me? And if I am only for myself, what am !?•85 
No one of these three perspectives has the final answer on whether we 
Page 48 
have, and how we are to act on, our obligations to future generations. But 
it does appear that these perspectives together have a great deal to say 
about the ethical role humans have in consideration of the future. While )f; 
deontology and consequentialism have long been viewed as foes, there is no 
apparent reason why they, along with the virtue ethics school, cannot 
instead complement each other 's perspective. One must account for the 
intrinsic duty of an action, along with the consequences of that action; and 
to be truly moral, one must be sincere, honest, and for�hright in carrying 
out that action. In terms of our responsibility to the future, if we use 
scarce natural resources today without considering the generations which 
follow us, we are clearly ignoring what might be termed the inherent value 
of conservation and solar energy and our duty of responsibility and steward­
ship; we are, likewise, failing to consider the inevitable result of such a 
policy (i. e. , the likely deterioration of health and quality of life) ; and 
we are falling, among other things, into the vice of greed. To phrase this 
in a positive manner, one might say that an agent is moral if and only if he 
or she takes intrinsic duty, consequence, and virtue into account. The kind 
of humans we want to be, then, are ones who do all of these things; to do 
anything less is to be less than moral. 
It is thus reasonable to look to a synthesis of the three schools for a 
suitable ethical stand with respect to the more specific problem of energy 
use. For this specific problem, as for the closely related issues of eco­
logical responsibility and obligations to future generations, what might be 
called an ethic of prudence provides a standard of moral behavior. Prudence 
would permit our society to avoid the inevitable harm of impending resource 
disasters. Paths of action we can take which provide a means to prevent 
ecological collapse, then, come under the heading of prudence. By looking 
at the implications of the three perspectives we have addressed, we can 
conclude that it is prudent to act accprding to their accumulated standards 
,r---� 1 r�tv,� -1--� �· L.. 
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in our efforts to provide a situation of sustainable energy for our grand-
children. In other words, we are bound simultaneously by at least three ½,. < 1 
ethical requirements in or�o act prudently: Ye have a responsibility t�· 
consider the future consequences of a present action, we have an intrinsic (� � 
., �J/1,- "7 .... �ll. 
obligation of concern about the future, and we must act in such a way as to c. 
reveal those virtues which demonstrate our care for that which has yet to� i--u---. 1, rvrl" 
happen. (Note that prudence is here used within the context of energy use 
and production; its applicability in other areas is not necessarily as 
obvious. > Given that scarce fossil fuels will someday fail us if we follow 
our present energy strategy, it behooves us to wisely invest our time, la,.,, .rrrt-.../�M.. 
effort, and resources in the means toward an appropriate and sustainable 
future. Thus we can make the moral claim that conserving scarce resources 
and developing appropriate technologies based on renewable resources are 
prudent actions. If nothing else, prudence provides an ipso facto ethical ---
Justification for the investigation of alternative energy sources. 
Thus far we have considered these ethical themes in the abstract, 
largely without a specific context for their application. One of the most 
crucial issues in this regard is human nature. If it is clear, as many 
philosophers and political theorists have suggested, that humans have a 
particular nature which is distinct from that of other animals, then that 
nature is a necessary part of any ethical evaluation. We have already seen 
that human nature relates to ethical questions in our discussion of the 
virtue ethics school of thought. If we look at the kinds of questions put 
forth by th
t
chool, Ye can see a broad concern for proper human charac-
teristics. eed, virtue ethics offers a concern about human nature which 
the other schools of thought igno'j The oft-mentioned query about "What 
kind of humans ought we to be?• forms an appropriate foundation for some 
large and difficult questions about the kind of humans we are and the 
00 
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elements of character we presently hold. 
If we, as humans, are concerned about the proper way to treat each 
other, we must know something about our nature. We might ask a sea lion 
about the proper way for sea lions to treat each other, but we ourselves are 
in a poor position to comment on the issue because of our ignorance of sea . � , 
��-- r lion nature. As Karx said, •to know what is useful for a dog, one must � 
study dog nature ••.. •86 Far from what is sometimes considered a •natura­
listic fallacy• (see Appendix) to link these issues, we may well have a 
Naturalistic Imperative to examine ethics and human nature together. If we 
are to rely on our inherent virtues to guide our moral behavior in any way 
as the agent school would suggest, then we clearly must exercise some faith 
in, and gain some understanding of, those characteristics we call •human.• 
But perhaps it is the pragmatic contribution of this perspective which 
is most important in connecting ethics and nature. If we are interested in 
achieving positive change toward energy sustainability through moral per­
suasion, our cause is advanced considerably further by promoting 
ethic than one of an abstract nature. A •workable ethic• may be said to 
have tvo primary facets: first, peo must accept the ethic as somehow 
possible; in other words, it must be suitably connected with reality that � 
they can imagine following its requirements. Second, a •workable ethic• 
must be doable Not only should people see it as somehow reasonable, t�ey 
must actually be able to do it themselve0 A utility official may state a­
willingness to provide free solar heating systems for low-income residents 
as a part of an ethically prudent energy strategy, but if the_utility c <-
� 
� � 
neither afford these systems nor find a willing manufacturer, then the et��: 
J---t_.-�-
has little usefulness. R.E. Ewin, in his Co-operation and Human Values,  
seizes on the first half. of this duality in saying that ·human life •.• makes 
presuppositions about human nature, and what it presupposes about human 
nature is concerned with virtues and vices. Moral philosophy consists 
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largely of the development of an account of human nature. •87 
If we accept, then, that •facts about our nature can have moral conse­
quences,•88 and that there is a particularly human nature, ve can begin to 
wonder what exactly this nature includes and what about it aids in the moral 
quest for sustainability. 89 It seems to me that, beyond the usual rhetoric 
about human consciousness, rationality, and so on, one of the key facets in �-our nature is the way we view our place in the universe. _£ross-c;;ulturallY, 
I would argue, humans see themselves as significant enough beings as to make 
some sort of difference in the larger cosmos. There is a peculiarly human 
resonance to being a part of that larger universe; 90 those who share this 
resonance have significant motivation. to live. Human beings have universal 
fears about, among other things, being lost (both physically and concep­
tually> . People fear being lost, they hate large uncertainties, and they 
tend to dislike being confused. It follows, then, that people rarely stray 
from what they know and understand - from what they see as •familiar,• 
empirically or vicariously. One' s identity is based on what seems familiar, 
and one's understanding, however dim, of the sense and purpose of the large 
cosmos is shaped by these experiences. 
If we wish to suggest a workable ethic, then, we would want to find 
moral principles which a moral agent could, and would, follow. And so we 
come to the dual issues of ompatibility and vision: an ethical standard can 
only •work• if its principles are compatible with the nature of its agents 
and if sufficient vision is established to motivate those agents. A require­
ment that people cease consuming all food for the sake of future generations 
would likely meet with some resentment, for it is poorly matched to the 
� 
needs of human beings. Even to ask that e reduce their electricity use 
by one-half for a commensurately ethical end would neither be met with 
enthusiasm nor, most likely, action. 
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In contrast to compatibility, which refers to the rootedness of an 
ethic in those who are to carry it out, vision plays a somewhat different 
role. Vision can be described in terms of the future. ftore con-
cretely, it involves the creation of inspiring and lucid possibilities for 
the future - or what I will call clarity. For humans to be inspired about 
that future, they must have some sense of what it is they seek: to discern 
how to reach their goals. Clarity also involves focussing one 's thoughts on 
that future and its possibilities. When a person is said to be •far­
sighted,• this aspect of vision is clearly at work; farsightedness connotes 
the ability to see specifically how that future offers an improvement over 
the present situation. Clarity ie the feeling that we want to get some­
where, and the intuitive understanding about where that is. 
C. S. Lewis, in his Mere Christianity, offers a wonderful perspective on 
a great many of these issues. He wonders what factors comprise the ethical 
necessity of living, and concludes with a set of three components: 
There are two ways in which the human machine goes wrong. 
One is when human individuals drift apart from one another, or 
else collide with one another and do one another damage, by 
cheating or bullying. The other is when things go wrong inside 
the individual - when the different parts of him (his different 
faculties and desires and so on) either drift apart or interfere 
with one another. You can get the idea plain if you think of us 
as a fleet of ships sailing in formation. The voyage will be a 
success only, in the first place, if the ships do not collide and 
get in one another' s way; and secondly, if each ship is seaworthy 
and has her engines in good order. As a matter of fact, you 
cannot have either of these two things without the other. If the 
ships keep on having collisions they will not remain seaworthy 
very long. On the other hand, if their steering gears are out of 
order _they will not be able to avoid collisions. Or, if you 
like, think of humanity as a band playing a tune. To get a good 
result, you need two things. Each player 's individual instrument 
must be in tune and also each must come in at the right moment so 
as to combine with all the others. 
But there is one thing we have not yet taken into account. 
We have not asked where the fleet is trying to get to, or what 
piece of music the band is trying to play. The instruments might 
be all in tune and might all come in at the right moment, but 
even so the performance would not be a success if they had been 
engaged to provide dance music and actually played nothing but 
Dead Marches. And however well the fleet sailed, its voyage 
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vould be a failure if it vere meant to reach Hew York and 
actually arrived at Calcutta. 
Morality, then, seems to be concerned with three things. 
Firstly, with fair play and harmony between individuals. 
Secondly, with what might be called tidying up or harmonising the 
things inside each individual. Thirdly, with the general purpose 
of human life as a whole: what man was made for •••• 91  
The actions required to keep a ship afloat are ones which are familiar 
to the sailors on board; the task of staying in tune, likewise, is compat­
ible with the skills of the musicians in a band. For humans to be able to 
care for their planet and ensure its longevity, they must also be familiar 
with that planet, and become equally adept at keeping it afloat and in tune. 
Their skills must be developed and honed to accommodate these needs, and 
they must be able to� with clarity the reasons for undertaking these nev 
skills. Perhaps this latter theme belongs in the realm of religion. An 
ethic, like an action, may be well-intended (i�e., cohcerned with the 
achievement of a positive outcome>, but that is not sufficient for sustain­
ability. The dimensions of vision and pragmatism are both crucial. Reli­
gion is intrinsically concerned with both. 
Why is religion pertinent to these concerns? Broadly speaking, reli- �;,_;-_�: 
gion as an institution has traditionally dealt vith exactly these issues, 
linking human nature with a vision of the future. When people feel lost and 
uncertain, they can turn to their religious beliefs as a refuge from those 
sentiments. Hot only can religion spare people the pain associated with 
these feelings, but it has a powerful positive influence in providing 
inspiration to motivate people to move forward in life. Ervin Laszlo, in 
his Goals for Mankind, assesses the prominent religions of this planet, and 
kind cross-culturally. One of the most significant of these elements (after 
an evaluation of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confuc­
ianism, Taoism, and the African traditions> is that •all the great religions 
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possess concepts and teachings which encourage concern for the future. •92 
Regardless of where one is born or what culture one adopts, part of one's 
upbringing will probably involve some teaching about the proper care for 
one's children, and the proper responsibility for the generations to follow. 
There is no expectation for Laszlo or most other writers in this genre 
that ve need a single vorld religion to maintain this concern and bring to 
light other large concerns. If such a religion could qualify for the 
visionary element discussed above, it certainly would find itself at odds 
vith that of compatibility, for it could not account for the widely diverse 
aspects of the cultures on this earth. As Laszlo suggests, such an idea is 
as unlikely as it is undesirable. But there is hope nonetheless for 
cooperation among religions: 
• •• unity within current diversity is pos$ible, and it is neces­
sary if some of the deepest thoughts and experiences of mankind 
are not to give rise to the exclusiveness and intolerance that 
breeds inhumanity and violence. Such unit is be innin 
today. Promoting it is one of the maJor tasks and 
ties of all people who cherish their religious heritage 
believe that it has a constructive role to play in the coming 
age. 93 
It is certainly the case that not all religious or ethical positions 
are equally responsive to people 's needs; yet, in our necessarily changing 
relationship with moral virtue, we continue (generally) to believe that we 
do fit into the •bigger picture,• and we continue to harbor a hopeful and 
inspiring vision of the future. In other words, there is some consistent 
force in people 's beliefs and motivations which maintains this hope under 
changing conditions. Thus, it seems that reli ion can and will rovide 
these beliefs, arraallow people to feel that they are participating in 
something worthwhile, something that •matters• in some way. Religion can 
provide both the message and the motivation to see to it that an ethical 
action is accomplished; its task is made easier it that action is seen as 
both desirable and possible. Every individual has the capacity to contri-
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bute to large societal goals, but every individual must take advantage of 
that capacity if ·the societal goals are to be realized. And it is not 
unreasonable to ask religion for that •calling,• for a message about the 
compatibility of moral acts with the way human beings are and about the 
vision implicit in carrying them out. 
On the particular level of sustainability, there is a growing litera­
ture linking ethics and energy from a theological point of view, emerging 
from a larger body of scholarship on the moral implications of nuclear war. 
In fact, some influential. religious organizations have stated their public 
views and policies with respect to both of these issues; in every case they 
have endorsed a doctrine of sustainability and restraint. The National 
Council of Churches (HCC) , for instance, released an official energy policy 
statement in 1979, based on an extensive evaluation of ethical criteria. 
This statement advocates a large-scale transformation to solar energy sys­
tems and other renewable resources, and sets out clear JUstificat�ons much 
like those discussed above: obligations to future generations, concern for 
the probable consequences of present wastefulness, and even a notion of pru­
dence. It emphasizes an energy ethic grounded on ecological ideals: •whole­
ness in the human and natural communities,• responsible use of technology, 
and the •ultimate obJectives of society,• based on stewardship, redemption, 
Justice, and hope. Terms like •sustainability,• •equity,• and •participa­
tion• appear often in the document, reflecting some of the moral priorities 
of religious institutions. ·The bulk of this •energy ethic• literature, 
written almost exclusively by scholars with religious 
with the same issues, with minor variations.94 There is a clear mandate for 
people in ministerial roles to begin educating and motivating their congre-
gants on energy issues. The issues are reasonably clear, and the ethical 
imperative is substantial. 
Page S6 
In the preceding analysis, ve have delineated some of the wide-ranging � 
C. 
r�11 � 
facets of internal ethics and have argued for �he inclusion of relational�,..->--
considerations into conventional moral discourse) In addition, ve have��� 
suggested that elements of our uniquely human nature cannot be ignored in 
the assessment of ethical action, and that we must continually ask our-
selves, as Lewis says, •where the fleet is trying to get to •••• • This 
discussion is not so distant from questions of appropriate technologies for 
the generation of electricity as it may sometimes have seemed. As ve saw at 
the beginning of this section, there is a lack of otivation for developing 
photovoltaics within economics, despite many political and technological 
suggestions to the contrary. It is nov clear that ve cannot simply wait for 
economics to make the case self-evident, though that will certainly be 
essential to the widespread development of the technology. Rather, we have 
a moral responsibility and a oral incentive to begin advancing solar 
energy, and to inspire those institutions which most influence society to 
begin doing the same. Gthe preceding ethical analysis, ve can see that 
photovoltaics contitute at once a prudent, visionary, virtuous, and humanly 
compatible means of sustainabil�tr) The question which remains is a diffi-
� � l? How do we arrive at energy
::::- �  J cult one: How are ve to (  - - - .. � er 
sustainability? That is the focus of the final section of this thesis. 7�7 
------
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Part III: Possible Strategies for Change 
In the last section of the thesis, I will discuss three •strategies• of 
encouraging our present society to think and act ethically about energy use 
and production, and, more specifically, to adopt solar photovoltaic tech-
nologies. Much of the literature concerned with environmental problems -. 
_-
�� I 
evades the question of Some writers imply that an •ethic• 
others suggest that 
society will spontaneously create a whole new value system for itself; 95 but 
the crucial issue of how these changes will occur is rarely considered. 
Occasionally a writer is honest enough to confess that an answer is not 
close-at-hand. Donald Ferrell, in a provocative article entitled •Tech­
nology and an Ethic of Limits: Beyond Utopia and Despair,• is perhaps the 
most blunt in this regard: 
How to awaken public concern on a national level and to create 
the legal and social sanctions necessary to pursue such concern, 
fractured as we are socially by narrow individualism and 
competing interests, is a question for which there may not be any 
satisfactory answer. I frankly admit that I do not have one.96 
This may well be the most important issue to address in achieving an eco­
logically sustainable future. While I cannot claim to have an answer, I 
shall attempt to discuss what seem to be the two most likely strategies, and 
then offer a proposal which synthesizes the key advantages of each. 
I shall first consider what may be labelled the •paradigm shift• liter­
ature, a school of thought originating in Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions. This literature sees no other way to achieve ethi­
cally feasible goals than radically to c�h���t�h�e�v�a�lu�e�s�s�t�e�m!!......!o�f�------,c..­
i.e. , to bring about a new paradigm. The other literature I wish to discuss 
is small but outspoken in its tenets: it holds that values cannot he quickly 
c�nged, and that what progress we do accomplish will be effected by small, 
incremental steps through a strategy known as •muddling• (or •muddling 
Page 58 
through, • as it was originally titled) . In conclusion, I shall propose that 
a technique which might be called •visionary muddling• combines the prac­
tical advantages of muddling with the visionary, idealistic attributes of 
the paradigmatic changes so often suggested. As we shall see, visionary 
muddling already occurs in the real world, though it will require a great 
increase in popu�ity before great achievements can be expected from it. � 
5:r� � e-,1_ � 
Paradigm Shifts 
Thomas Kuhn ' s  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was itself a 
revolution in the analysis of scientific thought. 97 Kuhn argued that 
scientists, at a given time and in a given subJect domain, hold common 
viewpoints, concepts, and •systems• -- which he labeled as •paradigms. • By 
tracing the impact of maJor scientists through history - including Galileo, 
Copernicus, Newton, Lavoisier, Einstein, and Bohr - Kuhn showed that new 
discoveries and new ways of looking at the world (as in Copernicus ' 
astonishing revelation that the earth is not at the center of the universe, 
or even of the solar system) profoundly influence the way the scientific 
community views the world thereafter. As newly found facts are added to a 
paradigm, it becomes increasingly tenuous and uncertain and is ultimately 
overthrown by a new paradigm. The process of achieving new scientific 
revolutions, in this sense, is called a •paradigm shift. • Such shifts 
entail large enough revolutions of factual knowledge radically to influence 
the methods and value system of the discipline in question. Kuhn did 
not see these shifts as taking place in any rational way, for he commented 
that •the competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can 
be resolved by proofs•; rather, he said, a paradigm shift was to be seen 
more as a •conversion experience. •98 
He took this notion one step further in suggesting that •the normal-
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scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only 
incompatible but often actually incommensurable vith that vhich has gone 
before.•99 The world as defined by one paradigm, in other words, has 
nothing in common with that of another; thus the two are difficult, if not 
impossible, to compare. As critics commonly noted, this signified an almost 
complete failure of both competition and communication between paradigms. 
In 1970, Kuhn came out with the second edition of the book, and in a 
lengthy postscript he answered this and other criticisms. In responding to 
the attack on •theory-choice• (including both competing and communicating 
systems ) ,  he suggeste� that paradigm shifts were matters of values and not!/
� _ 
�J��  simply discussions over facts. He contrasted theory-choice with the ---
incremental mode of debate over mathematical or logical proofs as follows: 
In the latter, premises and rules of inference are stipulated 
from the start. If there is a disagreement about the conclu­
sions, the parties to the ensuing debate can retrace their steps 
one by one, checking each against prior stipulation. At the end 
of that process one or the other must concede that he has made a 
mistake, violated a previously accepted rule. After that conces­
sion he has no recourse, and his opponent's proof is then compel­
ling. Only if the two discover instead that they differ about the 
meaning or application of stipulated rules, that their prior 
agreement provides no sufficient basis for proof, does the debate 
continue in the form it inevitably takes during scientific revo­
lutions.100 
In deciding between paradigms, says Kuhn, •there is no 
•systematic decision procedure• which will necessarily lead all scientists 
to the same decision. The paradigmatic •conversion experience,• then is 
achieved by group processes: •it is the community of specialists rather than 
its individual members that makes the effective decision. • He suggests that 
this is the process of persuasion, but that followers of two (or more) 
•incommensurable viewpoints• have difficulty in communication, much less 
persuasion. 101 What is needed, then, is a translation process whereby the 
language of one scientific community can be spoken and understood by 
another. He concludes, finally, that 
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Scientific knovledge, like language, is intrinsically the common 
property of a group or else nothing at all. To understand it we 
shall need to know the special characteristics of the groups that 
create and use it. 102 
Environmentalists were quick to adopt what they saw of the Kuhnian 
notion of paradigmatic change: this can in part be attributed to concerns 
about the man-over-nature mindset so pervasive in modern society. Writings 
of this sort have well documented the difficulty in envisioning a means to 
societal changes which might reorient the dominant views. Clearly, a belief 
in paradigm shifts has been for these writers a comforting hope about the 
long-term sustainability of humankind. 
The bulk of work on environmental problems and sustainable futures 
seems to characterize our ecological crises as paradigm problems. In other 
words, the responsibility for these crises is to be found in the mindset and 
v�e system of the people who cause the damage done to the ecosystem. (!� 
literature tends to approach the solutions to these problems in much he 
same terms: we need to change people ' s  attitudes, values, and beliefs we 
want them to cease their harmful and unethical act�o� Among those who 
have writ ten in this vein are William Ophuls., Rachel Carson, Barry Commo 
Robert Heilbroner, Garrett Hardin, Paul Ehrlich, Lester Brown, and E. F. 
Schumacher. 
In my Judgement, the paradigm notion has been greatly abused in 
environmental literature, and Kuhn ' s  definition has been lost in the 
excitement over the possibility of changing people ' s  values, instigating a 
wide-scale religious revolution, and reshaping society in order to bring 
matters like sustainability to the fore. In fact, there seems to be no - ? 
precise definition of the��ore. There are many problems and 
concerns hidden within any discussion of paradigm shifts � l will take up 
three of these matters here. First, what assumptions are involved in making 
a paradigm shift? Is it possible to look on the process of change as simply 
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a •strategy,• or are there hidden meanings beneath it? This is not a fully 
answerable question, but I will uncover a few underlying assumptions which 
are generally ignored in writings on paradigms. Second, how does the para­
digm idea apply to electricity generation? Can one say that there are pres­
ently aspects of a paradigm which are antagonistic toward solar energy or 
that a shift is taking place? This question will be answered with an 
extended example, based on a provocative new article about the Washington 
Public Power Supply System. Finally, and, to my mind, most importantly, 
what can be done !!Q!. to achieve a shift into a sustainable paradigm? If we 
employ the ethical themes assessed in Part II and perhaps account for the 
assumptions discussed in the initial question above, is there a clear 
strategy for forcing, or at least encouraging, a paradigm shift? 
Assumptions Behind Paradigms The environmental literature looks upon the 
paradigm notion as a strategy: everything will be all right (i. e. , the 
ecological crisis will pass> if we change people's values through this 
magical intangible entity called a paradigm shift. While it is very 
tempting to fall into this logic, I am inclined to think it a trap. It is 
perhaps worth remembering that hope was the only evil which did not escape 
from Pandora 's box; we can no more expect sustainability from a paradigm 
shift than we can expect it from a technological fix. The notion of para­
digm shifts conceals at least four troubling assrimptions: a) the supposed 
•rightness• of the new paradigm, b) the ease of transition between para­
digms, c) the distinction between thought and action, and d) what I call the 
--- ---.. 
•overlay• phenomenon in the hope for paradignratic change. 
The first of these concerns the paradigm itself rather than its imple­
mentation. Paradigm shifts call for •a profound change in values•103 within 
society. The literature tends to assume that the new paradigm is advan­
tageous over the present one and over alternative paradigms. But how are 
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these competing values to be Judged? 
Environmentalists often describe ideals of self-sufficiency, small 
scale, sustainability, self-reliance, community, and even such vague themes 
as honesty, modesty, sincerity, conviviality, etc. ; little is ever said 
about vhat this entails in paradigmatic terms or hov these themes compare to 
a •nev paradigm• offered by another sector of society for our future. 1 04 
What underlies the assessment of superiority is a moral argument: the nev 
paradigm is •right,• perhaps by a utilitarian notion that it vill foster 
activities in the best interest of a larger number of people than it vill 
harm -- but, again, this dimension is not spelled out. The environmental 
literature claims to knov what the nev paradigm entails - without ever 
Justifying, or, in some cases, even stating, it. When writers do identify 
factors vhich are crucial to the nev system, they are strikingly unimagina­
tive and, more important, unsubstantiated. Hovard Odum's •energy ethic 
commandments• are indicative of the values he expects to find in his future 
paradigm, but they give the reader nothing to fasten onto, nothing to relate 
to, and nothing, finally, to Justify the ideal presented: 
Thou shalt not waste potential energy. 
Thou shall knov vhat is right by its part in survival of the 
system. 
Thou shall do unto others as best benefits the energy flovs of 
the system. 
Thou shall Judge value by the energies spent, the energies 
stored, and the energy flov which is possible. 
Thou shall not take from man or nature without returning services 
of equal value. 105 
So the paradigm itself is mysteriously •known• and mystically •right,• but 
we are left wondering what a paradigm shift might be like if we can explain
� 




the actual attributes of a new paradigm so that s�ety has some idea whe� � +J 
it would like to go �nd whd it would like to be. If the new paradigm cali 
for a sustainable state, then what is included under the heading of sustain-
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ability? Is decentralization a necessary aspect? For the purposes of this 
discussion, these questions may be left unanswered, but if any group of 
--:,,�-
people wish to suade societ undergo a change in values for a partic-
ular end, they will have to be clear on what they wish to achieve. In the 
current literature, the paradigm notion is used without content, and without 
content persuasion becomes a near impossibility. 
The second assumption I want to mention has to do with the ease of 
transition from one paradigm to another. One might recall Pete Seeger' s 
•Talking Blues• for the ultimate in smooth transitions: 
How if you want to go to heaven let me tell you what to do: 
You've got to grease your feet in some mutton stew. 
You Just slide out of the devil' s hand 
and ooze over to the Promised Land --
•Take it easy - go greasy. • 
It seems that writers on paradigms of all sorts expect few troubles in dis­
missing the old and implementing the new. Or perhaps it has not occurred to 
them that the transition itself might be an issue with which to be con­
cerned. Some of the scenarios suggested for the •evolution• of a paradigm 
shift are at once frightening and frighteningly naive: 
After a paradigm shift begins, progress is fast though fraught 
with tension. People get angry. New discoveries pour in to 
support the new belief system . . .  , and scientific revolution 
occura. 1 O6 �: 
,; 7 
Perhaps these writers are relying, once again, on the utilitarian ethic that � -
only a few will be crushed when the rest rush for these new ideals. But 
nothing so simple can be assumed: If the new paradigm involves the decen­
tralization of decision-making and electricity generation, a weak central 
government, and an economic incentives-program for the use of renewable 
resources, who is to say that monied interests will not exert their power 
and start a monopolistic electric utility? What will prevent the organiza­
tion of new elites which strive to undercut the paradigm shift? How, in 
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other words, do we avoid hurting the many groups of people who find the 
present paradigm more satisfying than our dreams of a new one? In addition 
to knowing where we want to go, we must also be avare that certain aspects 
of the shift to that goal are subJect to external forces. In fact, ve may 
have an exceedingly small amount of control over the change at any stage. / 
Environmental writers in this genre107 seem to respond with the imp­
lication that I am thinking in current paradigm terms, and that •if I could 
only see• the values held by the new paradigm, I would be convinced to Join 
in the transition. Why should we impede the freedom of today 's society for 
an unknown, untried future? How can we have a paradigmatic revolution with 
nothing to revolt for? These are questions which these writers have failed 
to address in their fervor to get the shift over with so we can begin to 
concern ourselves with sustainability itself. This and the first assumption 
together lead to a rather unsettling scenario: As William Faulkner remarks 
in Go Down, ftoses, it is as if we were talking about •those upon whom free­
dom and equality had been dumped overnight and without warning or prepara­
tion or any training in how to employ it or even Just endure it •••• •108 
A third assumption is popular in literatures on all sorts of paradigms: 
once we have the paradigm, ve will be able to correct our old actions; 
therefore, all ve need worry about now is to change our values. In my 
opinion, the environmental literature has been particularly guilty of 
/] � As we have seen in Kuhn, 
1 
iY7 � 
y- _;...,'r-r ,.r-, 
equating •value change• with •paradigm shift. • 
there is certainly far more to changing paradigms than changing values. �c'r., -,...ls } 
Initially, a scientific revolution would begin with a reconceptualization of 
facts; the associated methods and worldviews are added baggage in the 
transition. His term, I wish to argue, has been compromised to signify 
exclusively a change in beliefs or values. If this were the case, paradig 
shifts would probably happen far more readily than they do. 
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While Kuhn never stated this explicitly, it is clear that the rarity of r , q  
shifts in history (the total number can probably be counted on two hands v0 vv-'J 
j,�, ,..,,._- v � .  J.., 
significant: to achieve a new paradigm there must be a revolution in though 
( 1 
i) .,.. 
and action. One can, arguably, change one without the other, but a paradigm� v�J 
shift has not been achieved without both. Polls have shown that many 
Americans believe in environmental protection and even in efforts toward 
sustainability. 109 But America's dominant paradigm can be seen clearly in 
the exploitation of natural resources, the use of nuclear power, the 
reliance on central-station power plants, the inflexibility of utilities, 
and so on -- pursued by many of the same people who express concern for the � � .. ).,.;_ �  
environment. Perhaps this is accountable to •salience• -- i.e. , environ- �· � 
mental concern is not a high priority for most Americans, so an expression 
of concern is generally not meaningful in terms of action. But the 
important point, I think, is this: It may well be that changing people's 
values is essential to the long-term habitability of •spaceship Earth, • but 
the task of shifting an entire paradigm is far more complex than many 
authors seem willing to admit or accept. In addition, a crucial distinction 
will have to be made between simply believing that pollution is evil and 
believing that one must adopt a pattern of life which fosters these changes. 
The current beliefs of Americans may not have advanced to that stage as yet. 
The final assumption I shall label the •overlay• phenomenon. A healthy 
proportion of the environmental literature looks to values out of America's 
'-.::---
past as the necessary constituents of an environmentally sustainable future. 
/ 
/ warren Johnson's The Future Is Not What It Used to Be: Traditional Values in - - -- -- - -- - --
"1 
!.!!. Age of ScarcityllO is only the newest and possibly the most hQnsst 
account of this sort. But regardless of the era from which this new para­
digm collects its belief system, many writers emphasize the need to replace 
the entire system we currently adhere to or at least to reconsider a great 
many of its central tenets. In place of wastefulness will be frugality; for 
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egocentrism will be altruism; instead of competition will  be cooperation; 
etc. Little thought is given to the relation between the new values and the 
old. Yet there is a relation: We do not actually wish to replace the 
system in its entirety. On the general social level, we do not wish <I 
imagine ) to give up many of our technologies and innovations, from contra­
ception to airplane travel to radio or telecommunications. 1 1 1  That part of 
society which is concerned with alternative energy is thankful to have 
numerous technologies in efficient submarine turbines for unobtrusive, 
ecologically benign hydroelectric power; computer systems to monitor and 
improve the energy use of generating facilities and end-uses alike; and so 
on. These technologies have· all been bred from our present value system, 
and they can certainly be argued to be important components of our modern­
day dominant social paradigm. 
The analogy I wish to draw is that of a common sentiment among adults 
of all ages: most of us, at some point in our lives, wish we could be 
children again, or wish we were young again. While that is a paradigm shift 
which is not yet technologically feasible, the parallel is an interesting 
one. For I think it is the case that the simple wish to be young and play­
ful is not the wish we intend vhen we express that wish. Rather, I contend, 
we are interested in going to a particular early stage of our past with Q.Y1:. 
current knowledge and experience. What we want is to be young and to have 
the perspective on being young which we now possess. 
Recall Emily Gibbs in Thornton Wilder's Our Town, wanting so much to 
relive a happy day out her life now past. One of her neighbors warns her, 
•Emily, don't. It's not what you think it'd be. • But Emily insists, and is 
taken back to her twelfth birthday. After observing herself for a few 
minutes; she cries -
I can't. I can't go on. Oh ! Oh. It goe• so fast. We don't 
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have time to look at one another. I didn' t realize. So all that 
was going on on and we never noticed. Take me back • . •• Do any 
human beings ever realize life while they live it? - every, every 
minute? 
•No,• comes the answer from her mother. Another neighbor admonishes her: 
Yes, now you know. Now you know ! That' s what it was like to be 
alive. To move about in a cloud of ignorance; to go up and down 
trampling on the feelings •• • of those about you. To spend and 
waste time as though you had a million years. To be always at 
the mercy of one self-centered passion, or another. How you know 
- that's the happy existence you wanted to go back and see. 1 1 2  
Looking down on the people moving about in the town of her life, Emily 
laments: ·They don' t understand much, do they?• Her mother again responds, 
•No dear, not very much. • And so the play ends. 1 13 
What we would like, it seems, is to •overlay• our current paradigm with 
one of sustainability. It is neither practical nor useful to rid ourselves 
of our sinful paradigm so commonly criticized; in all probability, we have 
little control over a paradigm or the means to its attainment in Kuhnian 
terms. As already noted, the simple fact of the rarity of these shifts 
suggests that they require considerably more than the mere will to effect 
change. We might spend our effort more prudently in adding what needs to be 
added and subtracting what needs to be subtracted taking a piecemeal 
approach to what is certainly a significant problem. Before advancing to 
that stage, let us briefly ponder some of the implementational aspects of 
----
the paradigm shift strategy, despite the clear conclusion that as a •strat-
egy• it is riddled with unanswered questions and unquestioned assumptions. 
Paradigm Shifts in Electricity Generation? There is clearly an American 
paradigm which Justifies our domination over nature, our flagrant exploita­
-------
tion of natural resources, and our narrowly economic concern for a material-
istic ·here and now. • Lynn White, in his now famous article, ·The Histori­
cal Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis,• blames the Judeo-Christian paradigm for 
our current environmental problems: •Both our present science and our 
} 
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present technology are so tinctured with orthodox Christian arrogance toward 
nature that no solution for our ecologic crisis can be expected from them 
alone. •1 14 This and other writings demonstrate the widespread expectation 
for a radically different value system to solve our problems. David Ehren­
feld follows much the same theme (though without the religious overtones) in 
The Arrogance _of Humanism.1 15 Part of this dominant para�igm dictates that, 
if the ecological effects of our exploitation become severe enough, we will 
employ innovative solutions known to environmentalists as •technological 
fixes. • Julian Simon is an outspoken exponent of the reliance on human 
ingenuity: his best known book is aptly titled The Ultimate Resource. 1 16 
Herman Daly, the originator of the most influential counter-paradigm - known 
as the steady-state economy - commented that three of the greatest technolo­
gical fixes have all experienced severe failures in solving environmental 
problems: the green revolution, nuclear power, and outer space. 1 17 
Nuclear power clearly does not by itself constitute a paradigm. But I 
think it provides a concrete example of some of the prevalent values in the 
larger American value system, a system which holds that •bigger is better,• 
that •the ultimate resource• will find a way to dispose of radioactive 
wastes, and that these power plants will produce electricity •too cheap to 
meter. • As Hazel Henderson appropriately subtitles one of the chapters in 
The Politics of the Solar Age, we are here concerned with •Nuclear Versus 
Solar Energy as Symptom of the Paradigm Shift. •1 18 Better to understand 
these issues, let us take a specific case. 
A consortium of ten utilities in the Pacific Northwest (which has 
traditionally relied on hydroelectric power for about 60-70X of its •fuel 
mix,• supplemented by oil- and natural-gas-fired plants for the region's 
remaining electricity needs) decided to invest heavily in nuclear power. 
The proJect they began was formally called the Washington Public Power 
Page 69 
Supply System < WPPSS) . These utilities had never built any nuclear power 
plants before, but they initiated plans to construct five plants simultane­
ously. Through a complicated financing plan, both the government and bond 
holders were heavily involved in the proJect. In the early 1970 ' s, when 
this was all being established, nuclear power was indicative of a burgeoning 
paradigm. Many people not only believed that atomic energy was the future 
of the world' s electricity supply, but they also invested in that belief. 
Charles Schultz, •Peanuts• cartoonist, had a • $75,000 security blanket• of 
WPPSS municipal bonds. The Vikings football club owned $200,000 worth of 
the same bonds. In fact, 78,000 private citizens from all across the 
country invested in the proJect. Many elderly people put their entire 
assets into it; for what could be a better (and safer) investment than a 
proJect which was both funded largely by the government and so clearly the 
up-and-coming power supply technology? This portion of a letter suggests 
the faith Americans had: ·When I told my wife about investing $25,000 in ••• 
' / 
municipal bonds, she said to me ) David: Are they safe? to which I answered: 
� / /  nargaret \this is the government of the United States. •
1 19 
But paradigms sometimes have the danger of being overly dream-like, and 
utilities had been living in such a dream: Despite many economic downturns 
in our history, •utilities have been hard-pressed to plan for anything but 
boom times, • 120 as demand for electricity has risen steadily for a century. 
Thus it seemed quite appropriate to build more than was presently needed, 
since other resources will eventually run out. < Ironically, uranium will 
certainly become scarce far sooner than water. > So the WPPSS planning com­
mission used optimistic population growth forecasts to Justify the need for 
future power and present construction. So optimistic, in fact, that they 
ranged above those of the US Census Bureau: • A  region with a population not 
much bigger than the five boroughs of New York was forecast to need more 
electricity in 1995 than the entire country consumed in 1950. • 121 
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For nearly 30 years forecasts of this type were accurate, but in the 
middle 1970's it became clear that the WPPSS utilities •mistook trends for 
destiny. • Demand for electricity was beginning to level off even then 
Just in time for the completion of the first plant. Through the later part 
of the decade, banks began to express concern over these trends, driving 
interest rates up to cover themselves. The multiple effect of high interest 
rates in tandem with cost overruns on the plants ran the total costs upward 
at a rate of half i. million dollars per hour. Nonetheless, the people's 
faith in that larger paradigm seemed firmly entrenched. As the author 
suggests, •people had a vision of a nuclear world, a faith in the atom 
matched by a sense of mission. • But •somewhere along the way the road to 
Eden went awry,• for it became increasingly clear that billions of dollars 
would be lost if all the plants were constructed. 1 22 
In June of 1983, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington •wiped 
out• all contracts between bondholders and utilities, and within a month the 
WPPSS proJect defaulted on $2. 5 billion of loans. 1 23 Now known as ·Whoops,• 
the system is likely to default on more of the aid it has received, for no 
one is able to pay the tens of billions of dollars which have been lost in 
the process. Thousands of Americans showed their faith in part of a para­
digm, and when that was overthrown, they found themselves with less than 
they had before. As these excerpts from letters painfully demonstrate, 
everyday Americans were dumbfounded by the default: 
I cannot begin to tell you the anguish, the arguments, the 
humiliation, the frustration I had with my wife when we heard the 
$25,000 will not even earn interest. 124 
I have been swindled. I invested $30,000 in Whoops 4 and 5. The 
money was left by my late husband, and it represents my supple­
ment to Social Security. I will be 65, too old to get a Job, and 
this default leaves me outraged, frightened, and helpless. 125 
The containment building for plant #4 (which was the only part built for #4) 
cost well over a million dollars to construct; it was sold as scrap metal 
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for a trifling $14,000. Today utilities in the Pacific Northwest are 
beginning (individually) to offer loans to homeowners for the installation 
of energy conservation measures. The Northwest has more power than it knows 
what to do with, and excess electricity (still produced by the old standard 
hydroelectric facilities> is now transmitted to Los Angeles to aid in their 
peaking capacity. Seattle City and Light, one of the only utilities which 
refused to Join Whoops, has enJoyed large profits over the past few years, 
and has begun subsidizing experimental proJects with stand-alone photo­
voltaic systems -- in one of the country 's least sunny cities ! 
Whoops, unfortunately, is not alone in its failure. Many other nuclear 
power plants have been cancelled, loans have been defaulted, and utility 
companies have found their capital requirements far exceeding any conceiv­
able profits. But Whoops is, to date, the worst of its kind. The consor­
tium finished one plant, mothballed tvo, and abandoned tvo more in the early 
stages. It set itself up for the largest default in U. S. history. One of 
the hundred lawsuits it faces is the largest securities fraud case in the 
country' s history. The worst may still come. In the mid-1970' s, the 
system's managing director made the following comment, and I dare say he may 
have been accurate, retrospectively: 
The nuclear and utility community of the entire nation is looking 
to the Supply System and its board to successfully complete this 
maJor commitment to nuclear energy. For if we cannot do it here, 
nuclear [power] may very vell not make it in this country.126 
Nuclear fission is not •making it• in this country, and its failure is, as 
Hazel Henderson terms it, •symptomatic• of the larger, systemic weakening of 
the worldviev that puts its faith in that •ultimate resource,• a resource 
which is shoving its fallibility. In Kuhnian terms, the failure of nuclear 
power may well qualify as a significant •anomaly• in the reJection of an 
outmoded paradigm. 
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How to Achieve � Paradigm Shift? We have shown, I think, that some 
tremendous changes are needed in the American value system which still 
upholds traditional nonrenewable energy sources. Yet we have also seen that 
defining the paradigm we hope to attain is far from easy, and that we take a 
great deal for granted in assuming we can reach it, however defined. Never­
theless, it is essential that society begin to consider what can be done now 
to effect a large change or paradigm shift to a sustainable society. Here 
is a summary of what some environmental writers think in terms of achieving 
such a society. 
Murray Bookchin suggests that the dissolution of hierarchy in the 
formation of his anarchistic state will happen spontaneously,127 and he 
makes an almost moralistic plea for change, saying that Just because •human­
ity was expelled from the Garden of Eden does not mean that we must turn an 
antagonistic face toward nature •••• •128 William Ophuls predict� that we 
will overshoot our environment' s carrying capacity by continuing our present 
growth, and only then will we be able to establish a steady state economy -­
unless we can achieve a value change first. 129 Rufus lliles wholeheartedly 
advocates the need for •a profound change in values and a compass that will 
take [Americans ] in a new direction. •1 30 He sees a growing struggle 
•between the ethics and ideology of materialism and the ethics and ideology 
of ecology,• which will encourage this value change. 131 For Hugh Stretton, 
it is a desire not for a new faith, but •to give better effect to 
we already have,• which can come about only through socialism, which he 
terms •government by consent. •1 32 And for Isaac Balbus, it seems that 
•authentic forms of shared parenting,• and the mutual cooperation of 
feminist, participatory democracy, and environmental movements will see 
through an environmentally sustainable society. Balbus ' transition begins 
with the motto from Woodstock: •teach your children well. •133 
Page 73 
What is striking about so many writers concerned with the future of our 
environment, is the vagueness with which these issues are addressed. Ho one 
seems willing to expose him- or herself by suggesting that we do X or Y in 
order to bring about a paradigm shift. I shall look superficially at the 
three most likely schemes of implementation to try to find tasks or threads 
of hope for what we might do now to encourage this •inevitable• shift. 
The first option is a large scale •revolution. • This is presented in 
Ophuls' last chapter in quasi-religious terms, while for other writers134 it 
is phrased more with ideology in mind. Nonetheless, they use terms like 
• change of heart• 135 •rediscovery• 136 •restructuring of knowledge,• •expan­
sion of awareness of comprehensive, eternal truths,• 137 and •right liveli­
hood • l38 as ways to Justify and implement the future they foresee. The 
problem with •revolution• as a strategy is twofold: First, if these are the 
terms which best describe the movement toward a sustainable society, then 
many people will be completely incapable of understanding what it is that we -
desire or see as necessary for the survival of humanity and the ecosystem. 
These terms will alienate people excessively, and could ultimately prevent 
an otherwise desirable large-scale paradigm shift. They may well see their 
present situation as bad, and a paradigm shift as being worse, especially if 
a revolution is needed to achieve it. The Irish folk music group De Dannan 
sings a song with a pertinent line: • 1  never saw a man with one black eye 
that wished that he had two. • 139 
The other problem with revolts is that that their outcome can never be 
foreseen, nor the toll they take if successful. If a large group of people 
is persuaded to band together to fight against the current paradigm (as must 
have happened in tti utions> , and they undertake 
a battle, in whatever form, to bring about great structural change, what are 
the likely outcomes? If they are successful, will they win over the antag-
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onists to the new paradigm? If they fail, can they ever expect to have 
their case heard again? Revolutions are costly affairs: once again, t�
� 
rarity in history is suggestive of the success with which they are w
� 
The second alternative is education. Proponents of this approach would 
probably want to see public schools, colleges, and non-institutional •moral 
education• (at home, in church, and at work, for example) provide, encour­
age, and inculcate the values necessary for a paradigm shift. But there are 
a number of problems with this •solution• to the implementational question: 
First, not everyone agrees that values should be passed on through an insti­
tutional process. Kax Weber, for instance, long argued for a strong dis-
tinction and separation between fact and value, .to such an ex.tent that pro­
fessors should refrain from influencing students with their value Judgements 
when it might endanger the teaching of more important facts. For, he says, 
students should be allowed to solve problems based on their own conscience 
and not that of the instructor. 140 � � ,- �/ 
�  -
For our purposes, the most significant question raised by Weber's per-
ception that there can be no •ethical neutrality• in the teaching of values 
is the age-old question of regulation: Who will watch over the system� and 
who will watch over the watchers? If values !!:.!, going to be taught, how 
will we ensure that those promoting solar energy, decentalization, and 
whatever else is required for a shift to a sustainable paradigm will be set 
forth, and not those of the current paradigm? These questions will have to 
be addressed if education is to play a role in a paradigm shift. 
This is not to say that education can be of no help. As Lest•r Brown 
comments in his recent book, Building � Sustainable Society, institutions of 
higher education are particularly valuable in research efforts which can 
precede these shifts. He aptly notes the impact of Energy Future, the 
Harvard Business School ' s  analysis of fuel usage and depletion; this work 
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profoundly influenced many officials from industry and government alike as 
no research with environmentalist origins could have.141 Brown sees further 
hope for education when colleges and high schools restructure course con­
tent, enliven the presentation of materials, and begin to adapt their 
curricula to older, non-full-time students who may have a greater concern 
for practical skills for a new society. 142 In an earlier book, Brown 
offered suggestions along similar lines: 
Since necessary changes in attitudes, values, and -lifestyles are 
called for quickly, the educational task at hand involves 
•reschooling• many mature adults. Because value changes can pre­
cipitate identity crises, such education can put great stress on 
the individual. Informal educational networks are needed to deal 
with emerging problems. Business executives may need to be 
briefed on environmental problems, and civil servants on popula­
tion dynamics. 143 
But Brown, of course, is hardly alone in seeing a role for educational 
institutions in a paradigm shift. Here are some examples of other writers 
who anticipate a role for education: Jon Van Til, in his Living with Energy 
Shortfall, sees a strong connection between energy awareness and the use · of 
conservation measures; education is one. means to heighten such awareness.144 
Aldo Leopold, in his well known Sand County Almanac, pursues this theme on a 
far deeper level: 
No important change in ethics was ever accomplished without 
an internal change in our intellectual emphasis, loyalties, 
affections, and convictions. The proof that conservation has not 
yet touched these foundations of conduct lies in the fact that 
philosophy and religion have not yet heard of it. In our attempt 
to make conservation easy, we have made it trivial. 145 
Wendell Berry, finally, favors education flavored with experience for the 
•kindly use• of natural resources. As he states in The Unsettling of 
America, •kindly use depends upon intimate knowledge, the most sensitive 
responsiveness and responsibility. •146 Surely we must use our educational 
institutions to facilitate a large change in the mindset of the populace, 
but we are at the mercy of time in doing so. The apparent need for a 
paradigm shift is that ecological scarcity vill close its grip on our life-
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style within a few decades. Only a large and precipitous change in our 
beliefs will reverse the screws on the vice� Education does not function in 
a short time scale; hence, even if we disregard Weber' s restrictive view on 
the teaching of values, the extent to which education can precipitate a 
paradigm shift is still unclear. � I/ � - - � . · 7 
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The third option is the broad theme of governmental solutions. On one 
side are theorists like Heilbroner, who recommends authoritarian, centra­
lized, coercive governments to see to it that the paradigm shift takes place 
promptly. But questions abound: How are we to transform our democratic 
society, partially central and coercive though it may be, into a truly 
authoritarian system? Who will run it? And how will we ascertain which 
values to be forced upon society? Garrett Hardin' s •mutual coercion, 
mutually agreed upon•147 offers a possible answer, yet the questions of 
implementation loom as large obstacles. 
The other side includes proponents of a form of socialism or •govern­
ment by consent. • E Stretton' s Capitalism, Socialism, and the Environ­
ment is one of a strikingly small number of works connecting environmental 
sustainability with socialism, sma� perhaps because the European socialist � 
states seem not to be moving in directions American environmental writers 
The same questions must be asked of socialism that were put 
to authori arianism: How do we make America a socialist state, a state 
providing greater equality among all people? At this point Stretton balks, vwr- l\r,-, 
and resorts to the kind of language seen in the revolutionary literature : 
To police equalities in a free society, there have to be 
institutional and technical means of enforcing democratic control 
of the use and distribution of resources. There has to be enough 
legitimation of government to make it a forbearing but sovereign 
arm of maJority rule. As a main part of that legitimation, 
political practice has to rest on a good deal of popular faith ••• 
Material equalities may not by themselves generate much brother­
hood, but they are a necessary condition of it. They may soon be 
a condition of government by consent: the only workable basis 
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left for social arrangements between political equals. 148 
If freedom and equality are as antithetical as some writers suggest,1 49 then 
the socialist ideal may require facets of an authoritarian state to maintain 
one or the other. 
With what are we left? Murray Bookchin contends that the new paradigm 
will - and perhaps should - come about spontaneously, without any of the 
/implementatio complications suggested by other writers. But Bookchin's 
sustainable society is largely anarchistic and thus requires no govern-
mental assertions of strength, no structural planning, no large-scale 
revolution. 150 These .ideals seem even less feasible than those of struc­
tured government. But the chances of anarchy providing long-term altruism 
toward the planet we inhabit are poor, to say the least. We are left with 
the empty feeling that society is helpless in effecting and inspiring a 
paradigm shift if that shift is required in a short amount of time. 
As we have seen, many writers agree that a new paradigm must replace 
the •dominant western worldviev, •151 but no one seems to . agree on how, 
when, or if it vill actually come about. The picture I paint may seem 
overly stark, overly tied to an •either-or• perspective, but I would like to 
suggest that it is the apparent need for paradigmatic change which presents 
such a portrayal. Much of the so-called •doom and gloom• 1 · rature at 
least implies that nothing short of a sudden change in values can possibly 
prevent otherwise inevitable ecological disaster. As we vill see in the 
next two sections of the thesis, this is not the only way to see the world 
and its future. Karl Hess, in his little book titled Community Technology, 
identifies what seems to be the one factor which separates the current 
paradigm from a future one; the status quo from utopia. He writes that much 
of the problem with environmental futures is what they require of people. 
For him, that makes them undesirable. While I would not agree with that 
. \ \ 
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sentiti:.1nt, his description of the.obstacles is apt: 
Utopias are not __ . unattainable, . they are �?limply · undes�raple. 
are, µndesirable because they mean.change· and change is .. .the 
most people resist with more determination than any other 
action.. · Any familiar situation is· preferred by most of us 
urn.familiar one. 152 




· As :we· saw-in. the disausaion .of -ethics in. Part I __ I-, ther.e,_fE:J a c;lear -link be.;;. 
tween visd:on· and the agents who hold a vision.. We might go so far as to say 
that the shaping of such agents' character <e.g., through-religion) is nec­
�s�ary fer the,:: ;formation_ o_f _ y_isiori; in the virtue sch9c,� Q _f: eth_ic�i -��011_gh�,. 
ve say that ·-moral<�ctions are evaluated.ion the :_qualities _of -the- person, .. 
taking those actions. A great burden is placed on human nature in order to 
achieve.positive change. What Hess is _ suggesting,· I think,. is that. OU� 
nature may not be up to that task. Whether or not that. is the case,. there 
a:c-e certain_dangers in this process. There is a cost to characte:r shaping, 
and there is no guarantee of hov a newly motivated and inspired agent Yill 
respond,. Society is taking a- gamble, as- it were, .. whenever it. attempts to 
reorient people tc an unfamiliar_ and potent.i�lly problematic situat,iori._ 
So What can humanity do to encourage ethical actions vhich will aid in 
the immediate transformation of the status quo tovard_environmentaliy sound-
goals? _--There. seem-�to' be tvo options: passive and ac-�ive. If we take the 
_passive app'roach, ·ye'·can sit back and_ let the .inevitable _ec:ologit:�l crises 
:force our behavior to change, as they surely_ vould if we let them. · Ho one 
re.ally knovs when .. th.is· is likely to happen,.· or ·what the human. reaction will 
be when-it does, but there is reason- to -believe that-,limited resources and 
eacalated prices (if nothing else) would cause us to•re...:evaluate our 
lifestyle.. .This- seems to me an irresponsible strategy, for it fails to 
account :rcr ':!hat E. F. S_chumacher .call�d the "right livel.ihood�_ o; future 
generations -- inclu_ding our �:nm children. _If society _has any interest in 
making-possible a future lifestyle resembling our ovn, then passivity is an 
entirely lli"lsatisfactory route to this future. 
Page 79 
Thus, ve must take an active role in bringing about improvements. As 
we have seen in the preceding discussion, ve are restrained from effecting 
large change if we do not have some sort of idea about vhat those changes 
are or about vhere it is we vish to go. Furthermore, ve vill not be able 
to make those changes as quickly as we might like. While a paradigm shift 
offers many possibilities for a sustainable future, it offers little in the 
way of pragmatic steps our current society can take tovard that future. 
Muddling 
There is another option that requires us to begin changing nov in 
the anticipation that such crises vould have a negative impact if ve do not 
work to prevent them. If extensive changes cannot be accomplished quickly 
under the present system, perhaps we vould be wise to vork tovard successive 
approximations of the future we seek. In other words, we should adopt a 
theme of muddling toward environmental sustainability. In the following 
section, I will rely largely on the two writers vho have gained the most 
fame for their vork in this area:�rl�blom and Warren Johnson. 
So what is muddling, or •muddling through,• as it is often called? It 
can be seen at once as a •highly sophisticated form of problem-solving• and 
•no method at all.•153 ftuddling is a blind fumbling for direction, a 
compromising between many interests, an adaptation to small concerns, an 
evolution of interests, and a response and adJustment to practical changes. 
What good is it? As Warren Johnson aptly points out in his book, ftuddling 
Toward Frugality, 
It may seem ironic to look on the stumblings of government 
as an asset in coming to terms with the future, but given the 
general resistance to change in any society, an inefficient 
government actually protects us from the dangers inherent in 
sustained economic growth to the point of overgrowth. Government 
inefficiency encourages - even forces - individuals to take their 
lives into their own hands, or in other words, to adapt. 154 
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The muddling notion was first articulated and popularized by Charles 
Lindblom in 1959, in an article entitled ·The Science of 'Muddling 
Through'. •155 If an administrator was to be given the responsibility for 
designing and implementing a certain policy, Lindblom suggested that his 
strategy would be to adapt the policy to established realities. He would 
probably not employ the •textbook• approach of listing and priority-ranking 
\. .  
the essential values and obJectives underlying the policy, becoming informed 
on all theoretical and scientific knowledge on the area the policy would 
cover, and weighing the relative efficiency of different policy outcomes. 
Rather, Lindblom expects that an ad�inistrator would take a 
coping strategy. He would identify a baseline, practical goal for the 
policy; he would ignore many of the social values which affect, and are 
affected by, the policy; he would •rely heavily on the record of past 
experience with small policy steps to predict the consequences ••. •; and he 
would take existing interests as the primary forces in determining the scope 
of the policy. 156 
< ; 
The fact is, according to these authors, that people (and, by exten­
sion, the societies they create) generally fumble along, and find their life 
patterns by trial and error, not by far-reaching comprehensive planning. {i_ 
would maintain that it is a basic character of human nature (by which I mean 
the set of patterns and habits that make all humans similar) 157 that maJor 
change is difficult to effec;J As Johnso:-:omments in a recent article, 1·� � 
cl�.�""--<. 
of most people is to minimize chan e. This is not surprising, A-<....� o17� 
given the disturbing nature of so many changes today.•158 What applies�� 
+--� .. individual decision-making is exacerbated in group-processes like policy- 1 r--
making and other forms of social change. Lindblom comments that •policy-
making is a process of successive approximations to some desired obJectives 
in which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsidera-
tion. •159 In sum, muddling is the formulation of policy (or change of any 
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sort) by the influence of multiple pressures, rather than the calculated 
planning of a so-called •scientific method. · 
A common criticism of muddling is that it fails to achieve anything at 
all. Policy makers spin their wheels when they muddle, and futuristic 
ideals are completely lost in the process. As Johnson indicates, muddling 
notions are attacked because of their tendency to •preserve the status quo 
or, worse yet, the power elite, rather than identifying what is truly in the 
public interest and working toward it. •160 A response to this criticism can 
be offered in terms of the public interest itself, so I shall briefly follow 
that argument. It may be said that it is the public interest itself that is 
highlighted in the surveys discussed above: people show that they care about 
environmental sustainability, but they would rather that the government do 
something about it than they themselves. I shall not here examine various 
definitions of the public interest, or even ponder whether something by that 
name even exists. 161 But if there is a public interest and if it is 
expressed through this kind of survey, it would not be unreasonable to 
assume that our form of democratic government is ever so slowly 
toward the goals which people have collectively desired. 
As a matter of fact, America's strongest solar legislation is buried 
a huge and complex law which was formulated on muddling principles. The 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 <PURPA)162 covers issues 
ranging from lifeline electricity and natural gas rates to peak power 
supply, from fossil fuel transportation to the proper use of hydroelectric 
power. Buried among its 80 sections are two which have attracted a great 
deal of attention among environmentalists and especially alternative energy 
( 
advocates: Sections 201 and 210 in Title II of PURPA require that utilities 
purchase excess power from small electricity generating facilities at 
reasonable and fair rates, and that •qualifying facilities• could produce up 
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to 80 KW (Megawatts) of electricity and still be able to sell the power to 
utilities at the same rates. 
As I have argued in a recent paper, 163 these sections of PURPA were 
strikingly ill-considered in the early stages of formulation. The 80 MW 
ceiling was set arbitrarily, with little evidence substantiating even the 
order of magnitude for that figure. The rates which were established were 
based on a Congressional reluctance to encroach on the traditional authority 
of state agencies to regulate utility rate-making procedures, a dismissal of 
exceedingly complex analyses (which were at the disposal of legislators 
should they have wanted them>, and a general hastening of the hearings 
allotting each successive expert less time in which to testify>. 
What is fascinating about this law is two-fold: First, while the 
decision-making process which brought it to passage was very much one of 
muddling, the end result was not at all incremental, hardly •at the margins 
of the status quo, � as one writer terms the typical outcome of muddling 
strategies. 164 Rather, PURPA has been the inspiration for more alternative 
energy facilities and more electricity (waste-heat> cogeneration setups than 
any other law in U.S. history. According to the office responsible for 
regulating Sections 201 and 210 of the law, hundreds of applications for 
qualifying facilities have been received in the last half of this year 
alone. Despite the Reagan administration 's apparent distaste for solar \ 
energy, 1984 will be a record year for PURPA applications! 165 PURPA cannot ) 
be dismissed as incrementally or marginally different from existent poli­
cies despite the fact that it was created by those methods. Lvv--� 
The other astonishing division of strategy and result in PURPA is the 
seemingly inconsequential matter of peaking. •Peaking• refers to those 
periods when demand for electricity is at its maximum, or its •peak. • For 
the vast maJority of a given day, a utility only needs to generate a base­
line, fairly constant amount of power to meet the demand, but it must have 
7 
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the capacity (i. e. , •peaking capacity•) to supply extra paver vhen needed. 
Peaking capacity is the most expensive part of a utility's operation, since 
it requires proportionally more fuel per kilowatt generated and usually 
requires the start-up and shut-dovm of equipment vhich is otherwise unused. 
Why is this important? In the hearings, the committee reports, and the 
final bill, PURPA never clearly connects alternative energy and utility 
peaking problems. It turns out that most U. S. utilities experience peaks 
sunny summer afternoons when everyone simultaneously decides to turn on 
their air conditioners and fans. The peak efficiency of photovoltaics also 
happens at the same time. PURPA has, almost by default, permitted a number 
of utilities to cease worrying about peaking capacity; instead, they gladly 
pay small power generators to provide that extra paver when it is needed. 
Thus we can see that muddling is capable of solving environmental 
problems, and even, more importantly, of leading us to a sustainable future. 
But we cannot, by any means, guarantee that a law like PURPA will happen 
again. In analyzing that lav, one has the uneasy feeling that it was a 
fortunate mistake, and that, if the legislators had considered it as care­
fully as they perhaps should have, it would not have turned out nearly as 
benevolent or beneficial to solar energy as it did. We cannot count on a 
haphazard, status-quo-bound process to solve our environmental problems. 
Muddling cannot be expected to give us a PURPA very often. 
� 1 
r. CA----� J 
"Muddling does prevent huge failures, but it prevents maJor gains as 
,� 
well) It would rather accept a certain amount of a factory's pollution in�  · 
order to maintain the Jobs of the workers and the economy of the factory 
town if the alternative were a comprehensive pollution policy which closed 
dovn all factories emitting more than X units of pollution per day, or an 
effluent tax on each Y units emitted. Due perhaps to its extreme caution, 
muddling is capable of preventing paradigm shifts of. all sorts from hap-
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penihg, for value systems are forced into a state only marginally (if at 
all) different from the status quo. For that perhaps we should be glad: the 
fusion power advocates are planning their small part of their version of a 
larger paradigm shift Just as the photovoltaic camp is scheming on its. On 
its own, muddling will not lead us to the kind of sustainable society seen 
as necessary and desirable by the paradigm shift literature. On the 
contrary, one could easily argue that the muddling strategy itself, which �-­
this country has accepted in its recent history, is what needs drastic 
reorientation if ever a new paradigm is to come about. 
Where does this leave us? Is there any hope for finding an unob­
structed route to sustainability? Has the literature offered us all of the 
available alternatives? These are questions which may not have answers, but 
they require attention nonetheless. In the following section, I will 




We need an alternative that avoids the problems noted above. The 
literature on paradigm shifts has shown itself to lack a concrete goal in 
terms of the paradigm it intends, or hopes, to reach; its implicit vagueness 
suggests potential difficulties in knowing how to reach it. Additionally, 
what a paradigm shift actually entails requires considerably more time than 
appears to be available for the required changes. We ask of our institu­
tions in short order what they have largely been incapable of accomplishing 
over the course of modern American history. Paradigms easily become 
overwhelming, too, for they tend to involve changes on a large and all­
encompassing scale. Just as the institutional infrastructure is incapable 
of handling tremendous reorientations of belief, these changes are probably 
incompatible with the day-to-day functioning of individual human beings as 
well. Finally, we have seen that it is not feasible to return to the past 
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as many environmentalists have suggested. Our society has advanced techno­
logically to a point where the reJection of certain aspects of our lifestyle 
will be an extraordinarily difficult endeavor. We simply lack the time we 
would need to find a compromise between the status quo and the ideal quali­
ties of the past. Paradigms shifts require both the necessary content to 
make the paradigm possible and the proper means to attain it. Our analysis 
has not led us to believe that these conditions have been satisfied. Para­
digm shifts have proved themselves an�-G-Option. 
Muddling, on the other hand, offers little in the way of direction, for 
it tends to work its way in minute concentric circles around the status quo. 
Incrementalism is extremely cautious, and relies too heavily on precedent: 
it rarely provides a clear goal or direction. In contrast to the needs of a 
paradigm shift, muddling is a slow, evolutionary process that requires gen­
erations to achieve perceptible change. In terms of shaping new societal 
values.to support sustainability, an incremental approach is unlikely to 
offer· any promise. If people tend toward the familiar by their nature, 
muddling can only reinforce this pattern, and only deepens the hole from 
which we need to climb. 
These problems point to the need for a symbiosis between the two strat­
v----�-__:.;, 
egies. I would like to suggest a strategy cil1ed •visionary muddling• as an 
----­
alternative to the two traditional options we have discussed. This scheme 
would combine an emphasis on the familiar with a strong sense of direction 
and which, most importantly, would hope to to bring about sustainability 
within a reasonable timeframe. Visionary muddling can be described in terms 
of four principles: a) the vision itself, b) the need for familiarity, c) an 
emphasis on empirical experimentation of alternative strategies, and d) an 
orientation to feedback. 
Vision is the largest single factor which distinguishes this strategy 
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from ordinary muddling. If people have a relatively clear sense of where 
they want to go and what they want to do, they are much likely to seek that 
goal than if there were nothing at which to aim. We have seen that the 
American infrastructure has muddled its way into a centralized electricity 
generation system which is inextricably tied to a tenuous and ultimately 
finite resource base. The usual muddling approach would maintain that link 
until the pattern is clearly maladaptive -- when necessity dictates an 
alternate pattern. Even with a vision as simple and indistinct as energy 
sustainability, we can begin working to avoid the �indication� of the 
---­
muddling approach; we can, in other words, avoid the consequences of the 
prevalent •better-late-than-never• attitude. 
In order to advance to the stage of developing photovoltaics, we must 
see the need to investigate alternative and renewable technologies. Without 
that simple vision, we have no hope of achieving any of our goals. And 
while sustainability is perhaps not a controversial or even a profound 
vision, it is probably more compatible with human nature than a more complex 
or more refined vision one might propose. A simple goal which presents a 
large number of alternative options and tasks has great potential where 
people might easily disagree on any single route. Energy sustainability 
offers us many diverse visionary activities. 
Another aspect of vision is the problem of inspiring people to have a 
vision at all. It seems to me that ethics provides the motivation to strive 
for a vision as well as some criteria for what that vision might entail. As 
we concluded in Part II, a synthesis of the maJor schools of ethical thought 
offers considerable power to inspire actions which contribute to the future 
of our planet and its inhabitants. Utilitarianism provides the mandate to 
undertake future-thinking actions and demonstrates our clear obligation to 
the generations which will •inhabit• that future; this parallels the para­
digmatic view in the environmental literature which devotes almost exclusive 
• 
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attention to the future. Deontology, on the other hand, suggests restraint 
in these actions by reminding us of our multiple duties to both the present 
and the future; we cannot simply spend our effort on future sustainability 
without taking positive steps to deal with present-day problems of a similar 
sort. The concern for virtue, finally, reminds us of the need for compati­
bility with human nature. Humans are unlikely to take actions which appear 
dissonant with their character and their interests •. When the visionary 
ingredient is added to this ethical recipe, people can find ample reason to 
become inspired to make a difference. Religious beliefs offer a great deal 
in promoting, among other things, 
world at large and to participate 
to be a part of the 
tions can be a central aid in the organization and presentation o 
themes. This emphasis on vision is a crucial addition to muddling. 
The second significant factor in visionary muddling is the notion of 
familiarity. Paradigms in some sense may offer a type of vision, but we 
have observed that there is little connection between humans as they behave 
on a day-to-day basis and humans as they· are supposed to behave in the •new• 
society. The classic statement in the environmental literature about a 
•drastic reorientation of values• would alienate a large proportion of those 
it reached. On this issue muddling shines where paradigms cannot. If we 
are to strive toward energy sustainability through the use of solar electric 
technologies, it behooves us to take small, reasonably sized steps toward 
that goal. Muddlers have long taken small, reasonably sized steps, but they 
f'� 
have never known of a larger g� thus their small steps have taken 
them in <potentially> random directions. PURPA was a case where that direc-
tion took a fortuitous and positive turn. People are unlikely to do what is 
not familiar to them, but they will certainly accept the challenge of a 
visionary task if its precepts are presented to them in familiar terms. In-
? 
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deed, William Ophuls has suggested that a paradigm shift might occur through 
the serial accumulation of small pragmatic steps - as it were, muddling 
toward a paradigm shift. Ophuls likens this to •the confluence of many 
streams into a river. •166 
There is another important element of familiarity to consider: that of 
experience. Steps must be cautiously chosen not only in terms of their 
scale but with regard to their !Y,-JLiJlrJ as well. The fact that solar cells 
are presently being used to power railroad signals, for example, could prove 
useful in motivating people to begin powering their homes. The proponents 
of paradigm shifts often fail to remember the importance of our past in 
planning our future; indeed, our background and experience may be as crucial 
as the vision which carries us forward. If nothing else, our history 
instructs us as to the errors we can avoid in a similar situation. ftore 
important, though, parts of our vision and our plans for initial steps can 
be found in varioue aspects of our past, and can be expressed in many ways. 
Religion could clearly play a useful role in suggesting elements qf our past \ _ 
w-lf � � 
which 11ight beco11e part of our vision. � .,.-,__ vy_;;x:r-""'" t�d, 
But religion is certainly not the only way for society to make profit-
able use of its past: this may well be the place for the broader application 
of education. If society can use its past and its experience to show the 
possibilities for the future, it is already providing itself with an educa­
tion. One of the most profound expressions of our history is in our folk­
lore and our stories. We learn a great deal about our ethical standards, 
our motivations, and indeed, our very nature, from the stories we hear and 
tell. For example, the Foxfire series167 describes many aspects of folklore 
for sustainable living in Appalachia. The Whole Earth Catalogs also provide 
a similar service on a wider scale. In fact, in The Next Whole Earth Cata­
log is a wonderful story about ·The ftan Who Planted Trees and Grev Happi-
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ness,• which could serve as an inspiration to many environmental causes. 168 
Stories and folklore about the country-life are not lost on the many people 
who will continue to be city-bound for the presence of natural imagery may 
well remind people of that vision they are pursuing. Our experiences have 
been passed along from generation to generation in both oral and written 
form, and we make daily use of their wisdom; yet, as soon as we begin 
planning for a bold new future, we seem to lose sight of the past alto-
gether. The familiarity principle advises that ve not lose touch� Gi,. 
7 roots and our heritage in our visionary muddling scheme. 
Another important facet in this strategy is experimentation - the 
balance of the experience notion. Policies and ethics which are created in 
the abstract often lack a sense for what is possible, and one of the best 
ways to find out what is possible is to experiment with different possibili­
ties. !uddling is an experimenting strategy, but it employs a •trial-and­
error• approach; visionary muddling would offer a more systematic effort. 
It will be crucial to explore many options in the quest for sustainability, 
and to test many alternatives empirically under •real world · conditions. 
For example, photovoltaics cannot feasibly be marketed on a large scale in a 
decentralized format until utilities have ascertained the extent to which 
maintenance can be accomplished by their own workers. If a system for 
repairs is not worked out before the new technology is widely adopted, its 
chances of political and economic failure increase dramatically. Experi­
ments to determine these requirements on a community-wide level would be 
ideal examples of visionary muddling, for they would allow utilities and 
homeowners alike to find out how satisfactory this new energy production 
system really is. There is no point in installing large systems before such 
proJects have been tried widely. 
The principle of experimentation also points to the prudence of 
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integrating many simultaneous forces, in contrast to the monolithically 
unified drive of paradigm shift advocates. Many different steps need to be 
taken on many different levels, and the more steps which can be taken sooner 
the more likely it is that sustainability will actually come about. Such 
steps would consist of practical proJects, some as only temporary experi­
ments and others as small but longer-term changes. The list might include 
installing a solar hot water heater, insulating an attic, or initiating a 
residential block-wide recycling program; it might also include larger tasks 
such as service or information transfer, from volunteer mental health 
programs to the new public domain •shareware• computer software movement. 
All of these steps can be relatively small and tenuous, but all of them 
suggest what Wendell Berry calls a •people-intensive•l69 - as opposed to a 
•labor-intensive• - society, based on participation, low energy use, and a 
satisfying lifestyle not paradigmatically different from that we live today. 
Finally, visionary muddling is based on a system of feedback. When 
these small steps of innovative experiments are taken, there must some way 
to assess their results, quantitatively and qualitatively. People must be 
able to know whether a particular direction was a useful one, whether it 
offers more possibilities, and how those new sub-goals might be addressed. 
Anything from a small community newsletter to a town meeting, from a high 
school homework assignment to a questionnaire could serve as initiatives for 
feedback. Building a new recycling center by encouraging public partici­
pation and following up the proJect with a widely distributed questionnaire 
on usage and satisfaction would certainly qualify as visionary muddling 
toward a broader form of sustainability. The same could be done with a 
school's solar electric energy system, with a system for monitoring com­
plaints about its deterioration, aesthetic appeal, need for repairs, consis­
�cy in providing adequate energy, and so on. The possibilities are many. 
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And the stakes are high. American society cannot afford to wait for 
necessity - in the form of resource scarcity - to decide how we are to 
generate our electricity. Within the next century, and probably before 
that, some of these scarcities will be upon us. But visionary muddling 
offers a preventive measure. It may help us avoid the trauma of sudden 
demise and strive for a brighter future without even the inevitability of 
such trauma. With a vision as rudimentary as sustainability we can begin to 
take the many small steps, to begin the numerous experiments, and to begin 
to see what we collectively think about their results, and we can accomplish 
much of the groundwork for a positive future before a different, less 
desirable future decides these things for us. 
The N�turalistic Fallacy 
Traditional ethicists sometimes speak of the •naturalistic fallacy,• 
referring to the problem of using •inappropriate evidence to substantiate an 
ethical or policy conclusion. •170 There are philosophical problems with 
creating an ethic which is based solely on empirical foundations. According 
to G. E. Moore, in his monumental Principia Ethica, the natural sciences by 
themselves could never adequately found an ethic, for there is a ·distinct 
class of ethical Judgments• which must draw on ethical premises. 171 To look 
to human nature, the status quo, or some view of •reality• for ethical 
Justification is to fall headlong into the naturalistic fallacy. 
But Just as an ethic cannot be founded on empirical sciences alone, 
neither can it be founded on ethical premises by themselves. The literature 
on the naturalistic fallacy seems to suggest that an ethic or policy can be 
based on one or the other: �hich is good, the other which is no;) This G 
extremism could perhaps be titled the ·black-and-white• phenomenon: the trap 
of looking upon any theory, idea, or proposed solution as either terribly 
ill-designed and hardly worthy of consideration on the one side, or utterly 
profound and critically untouchable on the other. In reality, the situation 
is not so clearly delineated; between the black of natural science and the 
white of normative underpinnings (if they may be so characterized) are a 
great many largely unquestioned disciplines. Economics, for instance, may 
be classified as an empirical social science, but it relies on powerful 
theories concerning human nature and the motivations of humankind. Is it to 
be ignored in an ethical consideration because it fails to fit into the 
convenient boxes of the two extremes it falls between? It seems to me quite 
clear that ethical and political conclusions must rely heavily on the 
physical limitations of the world they will affect. 
There are three categories of the naturalistic fallacy, and each 
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demonstrates this black-and-white phenomenon in a different way. The first 
class of error involves the susbstitution of the considerations of natural 
science for those of an ethical nature. Stating that action X is morally 
correct because it has a risk Y that is distinctly lower than the risk Y' 
associated with action Z -- this is fallacious reasoning. Worse yet would 
be a logic that risk A is moral simply because it has a low probability of 
resulting in disaster. Thus the ethical questions are circumvented by 
scientific analyses. ftoore suggests, and I think rightly so, that these 
empirical considerations are only part of the larger ethical Judgement. 
The second category of the naturalistic fallacy is that of deriving 
•ought · (prescriptive) statements from •is• (factual) statements. By this 
argument, no amount of empirical evidence is sufficient for ethical conclu­
sions. Moore states that the simple reason that an obJect is desired is not 
by itself grounds for concluding that it is normatively desirable. He 
comments, further, that it is wrong to assume that an action is ethically 
appropriate simply because that action is being undertaken anyway. 172 
Finally, one is in error if one fails to consider •the open question• 
of whether a thing is good even if it has been defined as good. If driving 
a car is good because it has the •natural property• of getting me to work 
faster, I have set myself up for the open question. Is it by definition the 
case that anything that gets me to work faster is good? And on what basis? 
All of these variants of the naturalistic fallacy have their merits, 
but I still maintain that their proponents are the victims of the comple­
mentary ·black-and-white• fallacy. It seems to me to be more practical to 
derive ethical conclusions from all parts of human knowledge in the pursuit 
of a sustainable society. 
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